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Abstract
We investigate the impact of regulatory risk on vertical integration and upstream in-
vestment by a regulated firm that provides an essential input to downstream competitors.
Regulatory risk reflects uncertainty about the regulator’s commitment to a regulatory policy
that promotes the regulated firm’s unobservable investment effort. We show that, when the
regulator sets the regulatory policy after the vertical industry structure has been established,
some degree of regulatory risk is ex ante socially beneficial. Regulatory risk makes vertical
integration profitable and stimulates upstream investment at a lower social cost. This occurs
for moderate costs of investment effort and firm small risk aversion. Our analysis sheds new
light on some relevant empirical patterns in vertically related markets.
Keywords: commitment, moral hazard, regulatory risk, upstream investment, vertical
integration, vertically related markets.
JEL classification: D82, L43, L51.
∗University of Bergamo, Department of Management, Economics and Quantitative Methods, Via dei Caniana
2, 24127 Bergamo, Italy. Email address: raffaele.fiocco@unibg.it
†University of Duisburg-Essen, Mercator School of Management, Lotharstraße 65, 47057 Duisburg, Germany.
Email address: dongyu.guo@uni-due.de
1
1 Introduction
A major challenge for modern countries is the promotion of upstream investments in vertically
related markets where a firm controls the essential facility used by downstream competitive
operators. Prominent examples include electricity, gas, telecommunications, transportation
and water network industries. The aim of upstream investments ranges from the reduction
in operating costs to the improvement in the quality of existing services or the provision of
new services, such as broadband infrastructure in telecommunications (e.g., Cambini and Jiang
2009).1 The upstream firm’s investment incentives generally vary with the prevailing vertical
industry structure, namely, vertical separation or vertical integration. Under vertical separation,
the upstream firm only supplies the essential facility. Under vertical integration, the upstream
firm also competes in the downstream market.
Given the natural monopoly feature of the essential facility, the upstream firm that controls
this facility is usually subject to regulatory intervention. A crucial driver of the regulated firm’s
investment activities is the regulator’s ability to commit to future policies. This is especially
the case in infrastructure industries, where the investment effort is typically unobservable (or
unverifiable) by the regulator and the investment process is irreversible, because the physical
capital deployed by the firm is industry-specific and cannot be economically recovered and
used elsewhere (e.g., Guthrie 2006; Newbery 2002; Pedell 2006). The uncertainty about future
regulation is known as regulatory risk. Surveys on business risks (e.g., Allianz 2019; EIU 2005;
EY 2013) systematically identify regulatory risk as one of the main business risks for firms.
The presence of regulatory risk has been also explicitly recognized in the law. The US Supreme
Court ruled in case Duquesne Light Company v. Barash (488 US 299, 1989) that the uncertainty
about future regulatory policies imposes a special class of risk on the regulated firm.
In the light of the practical relevance of the aforementioned issues, we attempt to provide
a theoretical framework that allows for a comprehensive analysis. The purpose of this paper is
to investigate the impact of regulatory risk on vertical integration and upstream investment in
a vertically related market where a regulated firm exerts unobservable investment effort for the
provision of an essential input to downstream competitors.
We consider a setting where the regulator determines the regulatory policy after the vertical
industry structure has been established.2 An important task of the regulatory policy is to deal
with the moral hazard problem associated with the unobservability (or unverifiability) of the
investment effort exerted by the regulated firm, once the decision about vertical integration
has been taken. A moral hazard problem emerges because the unobservable investment effort
cannot be included in the terms of the regulatory policy and the firm has an incentive to
underprovide effort in order to save the associated costs. In our framework, the upstream firm’s
effort is socially valuable because it makes investment more likely to generate positive economic
1The deployment of broadband infrastructure is a timely issue in the telecommunications industry, where
network effects emerge because of the interaction among different groups of users, such as content providers (or
advertisers) and final consumers. Broadband investments can foster content providers’ innovation and mitigate
negative network effects, typically associated with some form of congestion.
2Hence, the regulatory policy cannot affect the vertical industry structure. Practical evidence indicates that
regulatory policies are generally revised after a limited period of time (some years) and cannot prescribe long-term
rules that induce a particular industry structure.
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effects, typically in the form of improvement in cost efficiency or quality of the input provided to
downstream competitors. Vertical integration alters the investment incentives of the upstream
firm, which internalizes the downstream payoff associated with the investment outcome.
Two extreme regulatory regimes have been commonly investigated in the literature. Under
full commitment, the regulator can perfectly enforce the regulatory policy announced prior to
the investment stage, specifying irrevocably the remuneration that induces the firm to supply
the desired level of investment effort. Under no commitment, the regulator invariably succumbs
to the temptation to revise the regulatory policy after the investment costs have been sunk.
In practice, the extension of the regulator’s commitment powers does not take such extreme
values. This entails uncertainty about the regulator’s future behavior, i.e., regulatory risk. The
degree of regulatory risk depends on the features of the institutional and legal system where
the regulator operates. We model regulatory risk as the probability that the regulatory policy
announced prior to the investment stage is actually enforced by the regulator. With comple-
mentary probability, the regulator revises its policy and offers a new, sequentially optimal policy
after the investment effort has been exerted. Any probability of regulatory enforcement that
strictly lies between zero (no commitment) and one (full commitment) involves regulatory un-
certainty and therefore regulatory risk. We show that, contrary to conventional wisdom, under
certain circumstances, some degree of regulatory risk is ex ante socially beneficial. Perhaps
counterintuitively, this occurs in the presence of some level of firm risk aversion.3 To appreciate
the rationale for our results, it is helpful to begin with the case of full commitment, where
regulatory risk is absent. When the costs of investment effort are not too large, a regulator
with full commitment powers can promote high investment effort with lower compensation to
the regulated firm under vertical integration than under vertical separation. This is because
the vertically integrated firm internalizes the higher downstream payoff associated with the
upstream investment and commands lower remuneration. For moderate costs of investment
effort, the regulator induces the upstream regulated firm to exert high effort irrespective of the
vertical industry structure. This implies that the (expected) aggregate utility under vertical
separation exceeds the (expected) utility of the vertically integrated firm. Hence, vertical sepa-
ration emerges in equilibrium, and the regulator must provide the upstream firm with relatively
large remuneration in order to exert high effort.
Regulatory uncertainty aggravates the risk borne by the regulated firm. In the presence of
risk aversion, the firm requires larger compensation to provide high effort. This reduces the
social desirability of high effort compared to full regulatory commitment. As the vertically
integrated firm’s internalization of the downstream payoff mitigates the moral hazard problem,
for moderate costs of investment effort, some degree of regulatory risk implies that, differently
from full commitment, high effort is incentivized under vertical integration but not under vertical
separation. This makes vertical integration profitable and promotes high effort at a lower social
cost than under full commitment. Given that in the presence of risk aversion a vertically
integrated firm values any upstream transfer in addition to the downstream payoff relatively
less than a vertically separated firm, the transfer associated with high effort under vertical
3In an ideal environment where the regulator could perfectly enforce a regulatory policy contingent on all
possible events (including the vertical integration decision), full regulatory commitment would trivially be ex
ante optimal. At the end of Section 1, we provide theoretical and empirical support for firm risk aversion.
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integration must increase with the cost of effort to a larger extent than under vertical separation.
Therefore, regulatory risk is socially optimal for moderate costs of investment effort. Moreover,
firm risk aversion inflates the firm’s remuneration to exert high effort, which makes regulatory
risk more likely to be optimal when firm risk aversion is small enough.
Our analysis is presented in a fairly general setting without imposing any particular as-
sumptions either on functional forms or on the mode of downstream competition. As discussed
in Section 8, establishing a unified framework that incorporates regulatory risk, vertical inte-
gration and upstream investment, our study provides potentially relevant empirical and policy
implications in vertically related markets.
Related literature Despite the practical relevance of regulatory risk, the economic literature
has devoted so far relatively little attention to this phenomenon. Woroch (1988) examines the
welfare effects of uncertainty about the regulatory constraints on the rate of return, price and
entry. Ahn and Thompson (1989) study the impact of regulatory risk on the cost of capital.
More recently, Panteghini and Scarpa (2008) compare price cap and profit sharing rules in the
presence of regulatory risk. In a classical optimal monopoly regulation setting, Strausz (2011)
shows that regulatory risk can benefit the regulated firm and consumers under certain conditions
on the demand function. Extending the previous analysis, Strausz (2017) identifies the political
motives for regulatory risk.
Our paper is also related to the recent literature about the positive impact of uncertainty
on investment activities and social welfare. Pawlina and Kort (2005) establish that some de-
gree of uncertainty about a policy change accelerates a firm’s investment process. Analyzing
partial commitment in a lender-borrower relationship, Kovrijnykh (2013) shows that, when the
borrower cannot be forced to make repayments, a lower probability of contractual enforcement
by the lender can be welfare improving. Katsoulacos and Ulph (2017) find that, for any level of
decision errors made by the enforcement authority, social welfare can increase in the presence
of higher legal uncertainty. Lang (2017) demonstrates that legal uncertainty acts as a welfare
enhancing screen because the actions of a firm with negative externalities are discouraged in
case of low private benefits but they are encouraged in case of high private benefits.
Our work also pertains to the literature on investment and innovation incentives in vertically
related markets. We refer to Guthrie (2006) for a seminal survey of the literature on invest-
ments in regulated infrastructure industries and to Armstrong and Sappington (2007) for an
authoritative review of the literature on optimal regulation. Foros (2004) examines the impact
of access price regulation on the vertically integrated firm’s incentives to improve the quality
of the input used by downstream competitors. Building on Foros (2004), Kotakorpi (2006)
explores the vertically integrated firm’s incentives for infrastructure investments in a vertical
differentiation model with a competitive fringe. Chen and Sappington (2009, 2010) investigate
upstream investment incentives according to the vertical industry structure and the nature of
downstream competition. Klumpp and Su (2010, 2015) construct a model of open access where
a vertically integrated firm shares an upstream essential resource with downstream competi-
tors at a regulated tariff, and provide empirical support for their results. Investments in the
Internet services have recently attracted increasing attention in the theoretical and practical
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debate, often in association with the issue of net neutrality. Bourreau et al. (2015) show that,
in the presence of Internet platform competition, a discriminatory regime leads to an increase
in broadband investments and content innovation compared to net neutrality regulation.
Our model allows for firm risk aversion. As empirically documented by Greenwald and
Stiglitz (1993), financial market imperfections induce firms to act in a risk-averse manner, be-
cause they can diversify risks only partially. Such risk attitude may also stem from control
delegation to risk-averse managers (e.g., Gervais 2018). Asplund (2002) and Banal-Estan˜ol and
Ottaviani (2006) report that there exist a multiplicity of reasons why firms, including large
companies, can be risk averse, such as concentrated ownership, limited hedging, managerial
control, costly bankruptcy, limited debt capacity, liquidity constraints, costly financial distress,
imperfect risk management, and nonlinear tax systems. Firm risk aversion has been also ex-
plored in the literature about asymmetric information. Laffont and Rochet (1998) characterize
the optimal regulation of a risk-averse firm. Iossa and Martimort (2016) examine risk allocation
and contractual choices in a public procurement setting where the contractor is risk averse. Arve
and Martimort (2016) investigate the optimal dynamic contract when the procurement process
involves future add-ons, and provide significant support for the firm’s reluctance to bear risks.
To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first contribution that includes significant ele-
ments identified by Chen and Sappington (2009, p. 398) for future research in vertically related
markets, such as stochastic outcomes driven by unobservable investment effort and endogenous
choice of vertical integration, particularly in the presence of firm risk aversion.
Structure of the paper The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out the
formal model. After exploring the case of full commitment, Section 3 investigates regulatory
risk and derives the main results. Using explicit functions, Section 4 provides additional results.
Section 5 discusses the robustness of the model and various extensions. Section 6 examines the
determinants of regulatory risk. Section 7 concludes with some empirical and policy implica-
tions. The main formal proofs are collected in the Appendix. Additional formal results and
associated proofs are available in the Supplementary Appendix.
2 The model
Setting We consider a vertically related market where an upstream regulated firm exerts an
investment effort e that is unobservable (or unverifiable) by the regulator. The investment
effort can be either low or high. The cost of effort ψe is normalized to zero for low effort and
is equal to ψ > 0 for high effort. If the firm chooses high effort, the investment outcome is a
“success” with probability νh ∈ (0, 1), whereas it is a “failure” with complementary probability
1−νh. The investment outcome may refer to cost efficiency or input quality. If the firm chooses
low effort, the probabilities of investment success and failure are respectively νl ∈ (0, 1) and
1 − νl, where ∆ν ≡ νh − νl > 0. Intuitively, high effort makes the investment more likely to
be successful. Our framework identifies a classical moral hazard problem, which is suitable to
describe investment activities in regulated industries.
The upstream firm receives a transfer t ∈ R determined by the regulator and incurs the cost
of effort ψe. Without any loss of generality, additional production costs are normalized to zero.
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The upstream firm’s utility is
Πu = u (t)− ψe, (1)
where u (·) is an increasing and (weakly) concave utility function, i.e., u′ (·) > 0 and u′′ (·) ≤ 0,
with u′′ (·) < 0 under firm risk aversion.4 We adopt the standard normalization u (0) = 0. The
upstream regulated firm is protected by limited liability that allows the firm to obtain nonnega-
tive payoffs (e.g., Guthrie 2006). The opportunity to provide costless low effort implies that the
limited liability constraint is t ≥ 0. As the firm’s effort is unobservable (or unverifiable) by the
regulator, the upstream transfer can only depend on the investment outcome, i.e., t ∈
{
t, t
}
,
where t identifies the transfer conditional on the investment success and t the corresponding
transfer conditional on the investment failure.
The downstream market is served by competitive firms. We denote by u (pi) the utility
of a downstream firm associated with the payoff pi ≥ 0, where u (·) is defined above.5 The
upstream firm’s investment success provides each downstream firm with a higher payoff (and
utility) compared to investment failure, i.e., pi ∈ {pi, pi} and pi > pi. This formulation admits
different natural economic interpretations. A successful investment can reduce the price or
improve the quality of the input provided to downstream firms, which in turn decreases their
costs or increases the willingness to pay of their customers. Moreover, technological spillovers
can enhance the efficiency of downstream firms.
The upstream firm decides whether to integrate with a downstream firm. The vertically
integrated firm’s utility is
Πvi = u (t+ pi)− ψe. (2)
Under vertical integration, the firm receives the transfer t from the upstream regulated activities
and the payoff pi from the downstream competitive activities, with associated utility u (·), and
incurs the cost of effort ψe. Vertical integration is profitable if and only if the (expected) utility of
the vertically integrated firm exceeds the (expected) aggregate utility under vertical separation,
i.e., E [Πvi] ≥ E [Πvs], where Πvs ≡ Πu + u (pi).
6 Note from (1) and (2) that, under firm risk
aversion, vertical separation is preferred to vertical integration for a given transfer. The choice
of vertical integration comes at a cost and, as shown in the subsequent analysis, it depends on
the regulatory regime in a nontrivial manner. Since in practice regulatory intervention is limited
to the monopolistic input and cross-subsidization between regulated and competitive activities
is prohibited, the regulator focuses on the viability of regulated activities (e.g., Vickers 1995, p.
4The assumption of additively separable preferences is standard in the moral hazard literature and simplifies
the analysis substantially, without involving a relevant loss of generality (e.g., Armstrong and Sappington 2007;
Laffont and Martimort 2002; Macho-Stadler and Pe´rez-Castrillo 2001). In the Supplementary Appendix, we show
that our results still hold when preferences are not additively separable.
5Nothing substantial would change with heterogeneous firms. Moreover, as explained in Section 5.1, the
formalization of the access price for the upstream input does not alter our qualitative results.
6Common regulatory practices prescribe that regulated and competitive activities must be legally unbundled.
Hence, the downstream division of the vertically integrated firm operates as under vertical separation, and the
downstream payoff pi is independent of the vertical industry structure. A fortiori, this holds in our setting where
the upstream payoff is fully determined at the regulation stage. We refer to Section 5.2 for further discussion on
this point. As will be clear in the sequel, privately beneficial vertical integration is also welfare enhancing but the
converse may not be true. Remarkably, vertical integration does not necessarily increase welfare in our setting.
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14). Then, the limited liability constraint t ≥ 0 still applies under vertical integration.
The regulator’s social welfare function is
W = S − t. (3)
The gross surplus from investment S > 0 is higher in case of investment success than in case
of failure, i.e., S ∈
{
S, S
}
and ∆S ≡ S − S > 0.7 A successful investment leads to lower final
prices or higher quality of the good. A natural interpretation for S is the consumer surplus
from purchasing the good in the downstream market. This reflects the mandate of modern
regulatory agencies. For instance, the UK Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem) states
that “[o]ur principal duty is to protect the interests of current and future consumers”. In the
same vein, the mission of the US Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) is to “[a]ssist
consumers in obtaining economically efficient, safe, reliable, and secure energy services”.8 The
transfer t accruing to the upstream regulated firm reduces social welfare in (3). A significant
portion of the regulated firm’s revenues typically stems from public subsidies.9
Regulation Following the relevant literature and the regulatory practices worldwide, we as-
sume that regulation takes place after the vertical industry structure has been established (e.g.,
Chen and Sappington 2009, 2010; Foros 2004; Klumpp and Su 2010, 2015; Kotakorpi 2006;
Vickers 1995). The regulatory policy offered prior to the investment stage is enforced with
probability α ∈ [0, 1]. With complementary probability 1 − α, the regulator revises its policy
and offers a new, sequentially optimal policy after the regulated firm’s investment has been
undertaken. Any probability α ∈ (0, 1) of regulatory enforcement involves uncertainty about
the regulator’s behavior and therefore regulatory risk. This formalization is in line with the
determinants of regulatory risk discussed in Section 6.
Timing and equilibrium concept The timing of the game unfolds as follows.
(I) The regulatory regime is determined, which entails a probability α ∈ [0, 1] of regulatory
enforcement.
(II) The upstream regulated firm decides whether to integrate with a downstream firm.
(III) The regulator offers a regulatory policy to the (vertically separated or integrated) regulated
firm. If the offer is rejected, the game ends. If the offer is accepted, the regulated firm exerts
unobservable investment effort and the investment outcome is realized.
(IV) The regulatory policy is enforced with probability α ∈ [0, 1]. With probability 1 − α,
the regulator makes a new offer, which is either rejected (the game ends) or accepted by the
7Following the main literature, the regulator is risk neutral. The gross surplus S is independent of the vertical
industry structure because vertical integration does not alter the downstream outcome, as previously discussed.
8These quotations are respectively taken from Ofgem’s website https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/about-us/how-we-
engage/engaging-consumer-issues and FERC’s website https://www.ferc.gov/about/about.asp (last retreived in
December 2019). Fiocco and Strausz (2015) provide theoretical support for the regulator’s adoption of a pure
consumer surplus mandate. Our qualitative results remain valid when social welfare is a weighted sum of consumer
surplus and firms’ utilities, provided that the weight on firms’ utilities is not too large.
9Socially costly transfers reflect distributional considerations (Baron and Myerson 1982) or the social cost of
public funds due to distortionary taxation (Laffont and Tirole 1986). Miniaci et al. (2016) conduct an empirical
analysis of subsidies in energy markets. Information about public funds in the US transportation industry is
available at https://www.bts.gov/topics/national-transportation-statistics (last retrieved in December 2019).
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regulated firm.
(V) Downstream competition takes place and firms’ payoffs materialize.
The regulation stage precedes the competition stage. This reflects the greater rigidity of
regulatory procedures with respect to market activities. The order of the fourth and fifth stage
is irrelevant, because firms’ payoffs do not depend on the actual enforcement of the regulatory
policy (although they depend on the investment outcome in the third stage). The equilibrium
concept is the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. We solve this game by backward induction.
3 Main results
In the following lemma we summarize what happens when the cost of high investment effort is
relatively small.
Lemma 1 Suppose ψ ≤ ψ0 ≡ ∆ν [u (pi)− u (pi)]. Then, the equilibrium probability of regulatory
enforcement is α∗ = 0. Vertical integration emerges, and high investment effort is provided at
no social cost.
When the probability of regulatory enforcement is zero, the regulator invariably revises the
policy offered to the regulated firm before the investment stage and determines a new, sequen-
tially optimal policy after the investment costs have been sunk. As transfers are socially costly,
the regulated firm receives the lowest transfer compatible with limited liability irrespective of
the investment outcome, i.e., t = t = 0. A vertically integrated firm provides high effort as
long as the corresponding cost is outweighed by the expected increase in the downstream util-
ity arising from the investment, i.e., ψ ≤ ψ0 ≡ ∆ν [u (pi)− u (pi)]. Conversely, under vertical
separation, the upstream firm prefers to exert (costless) low effort to avoid a loss equal to the
cost of high effort ψ. Anticipating that high effort will be exerted under vertical integration but
low effort will be exerted under vertical separation, the upstream firm and a downstream firm
prefer to vertically integrate. As Lemma 1 indicates, the equilibrium probability of regulatory
enforcement α∗ = 0 allows the regulator to promote high effort with zero transfers, and the
decision of vertical integration is welfare enhancing.
Under the condition stated in Lemma 1, the moral hazard problem associated with unob-
servable investment effort is costlessly removed by vertical integration. Throughout the analysis,
we impose the following assumption.
Assumption 1 ψ > ψ0 ≡ ∆ν [u (pi)− u (pi)].
Assumption 1 ensures that the cost of high effort is sufficiently large that the moral hazard
problem requires (costly) regulatory intervention to incentivize the effort provision.
3.1 Full commitment
To better appreciate the role of regulatory risk, we begin with the case of a regulatory regime
characterized by full commitment. The regulatory policy offered prior to the investment stage
is enforced with certainty, i.e., α = 1, and therefore regulatory risk is absent. Under vertical
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separation, when the regulator wants to induce (unobservable) high effort, the upstream firm’s
(expected) utility from high effort must exceed the corresponding utility from low effort. This
identifies the moral hazard incentive constraint Eh [Πu] ≥ El [Πu], where Πu is given by (1).
Analogously, under vertical integration, when the regulator wishes to promote high effort, the
vertically integrated firm’s (expected) utility from high effort must exceed the corresponding
utility from low effort. Hence, the moral hazard incentive constraint becomes Eh [Πvi] ≥ El [Πvi],
where Πvi is given by (2). If investment has failed, the regulator sets the lowest (socially costly)
transfer compatible with the regulated firm’s limited liability irrespective of the vertical industry
structure. The limited liability constraint is binding in equilibrium, and the full commitment
transfers are zero in case of investment failure. If investment has succeeded, the full commitment
transfers under vertical separation and vertical integration respectively make the moral hazard
incentive constraints Eh [Πu] ≥ El [Πu] and Eh [Πvi] ≥ El [Πvi] binding in equilibrium. As in any
classical moral hazard problem, the transfer is higher in case of investment success than in case
of failure in order to incentivize high effort. Intuitively, the upstream expected transfers increase
with the cost of high effort ψ. In the following lemma, we compare the expected transfers that
ensure high effort in the two vertical industry structures.
Lemma 2 Under firm risk neutrality (u′′ (·) = 0), it holds Eh [t
c
vi] < Eh [t
c
vs]. Under firm risk
aversion (u′′ (·) < 0), there exists a threshold ψ1, with ψ1 > ψ0, such that Eh [t
c
vi] < Eh [t
c
vs] if
and only if ψ < ψ1.
Under firm risk neutrality, the full commitment expected transfer that induces high effort
is unambiguously lower under vertical integration than under vertical separation, i.e., Eh [t
c
vi] <
Eh [t
c
vs]. The vertically integrated firm’s internalization of the downstream payoff mitigates
the moral hazard problem, which allows the regulator to provide a lower transfer than under
vertical separation when high effort is desired. However, in the presence of firm risk aversion,
the vertically integrated firm values any transfer in addition to its downstream payoff relatively
less than under vertical separation. This strengthens the vertically integrated firm’s reluctance
to exert high effort. Therefore, the transfer that promotes high effort must increase with the
cost of effort to a larger extent under vertical integration than under vertical separation. As
Lemma 2 indicates, the expected transfer is still lower under vertical integration as long as the
cost of high effort is below a certain threshold, i.e., ψ < ψ1. Notably, the threshold ψ1 may be
significantly large, especially with a small degree of firm risk aversion.
We are now in a position to formalize the results under full commitment, where the regula-
tory policy is enforced with certainty.
Proposition 1 Suppose that the probability of regulatory enforcement is α = 1.
(i) If Eh [t
c
vs] < ∆ν∆S, vertical separation emerges, and high investment effort is provided.
(ii) If Eh [t
c
vi] < ∆ν∆S ≤ Eh [t
c
vs], vertical integration emerges, and high investment effort is
provided.
(iii) Otherwise, i.e., if min {Eh [t
c
vi] ,Eh [t
c
vs]} ≥ ∆ν∆S, the vertical industry structure is incon-
sequential, and low investment effort is provided.
The results in Proposition 1 are summarized in Table 1. As point (i) of Proposition 1 indi-
cates, vertical separation arises and high investment effort is exerted if the (expected) transfer
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Expected transfers industry structure investment
Eh [t
c
vi] < ∆ν∆S vertical separation high
Eh [t
c
vi] < ∆ν∆S ≤ Eh [t
c
vs] vertical integration high
min {Eh [t
c
vi] ,Eh [t
c
vs]} ≥ ∆ν∆S
vertical integration
or vertical separation
low
Table 1: Full commitment (α = 1).
under vertical separation is lower than the (expected) social welfare gain from high effort, i.e.,
Eh [t
c
vs] < ∆ν∆S. This occurs when the cost of high effort ψ is relatively small with respect
to the social welfare gain. Note that the outcome in point (i) holds irrespective of the magni-
tude of the expected transfer Eh [t
c
vi] under vertical integration. To understand the rationale
for this result, it is useful to recall from Lemma 2 that the expected transfer associated with
high effort is lower under vertical integration than under vertical separation (Eh [t
c
vi] < Eh [t
c
vs])
in case of firm risk neutrality as well as risk aversion for a cost of high effort below a certain
threshold, i.e., ψ < ψ1. This implies that the regulator prefers vertical integration to vertical
separation. Given the condition in point (i) of Proposition 1, anticipating that high effort will
be incentivized regardless of the vertical industry structure and that the expected transfer is
lower under vertical integration (Eh [t
c
vi] < Eh [t
c
vs] < ∆ν∆S), the upstream firm and a down-
stream firm find vertical separation more attractive. The regulator must provide the vertically
separated upstream firm with relatively large compensation to induce high effort. In the pres-
ence of firm risk aversion, when the cost of high effort is above the aforementioned threshold,
i.e., ψ ≥ ψ1, the interests of the regulator are aligned with those of the firms. We know from
Lemma 2 that the expected transfer under vertical integration is higher than under vertical
separation (Eh [t
c
vi] ≥ Eh [t
c
vs]). Hence, the regulator now prefers vertical separation when high
effort is promoted. Given the condition in point (i) of Proposition 1, anticipating that high
effort will be incentivized at least under vertical separation (Eh [t
c
vs] < ∆ν∆S), the firms still
find vertical separation more profitable. This is because, if high effort is also induced under
vertical integration, the internalization of the downstream payoff alleviates the moral hazard
problem, and therefore the firms obtain lower (expected) aggregate utility under vertical inte-
gration than under vertical separation, despite a higher transfer. If low effort is induced under
vertical integration, the firms’ incentives for vertical separation are amplified.
Point (ii) of Proposition 1 shows that vertical integration emerges and high effort is provided
for intermediate costs of high effort such that the (expected) transfer under vertical integration
is lower but the (expected) transfer under vertical separation is higher than the (expected) social
welfare gain, i.e., Eh [t
c
vi] < ∆ν∆S ≤ Eh [t
c
vs]. It follows from Lemma 2 that the outcome in
point (ii) requires that the cost of high effort ψ must be below the threshold ψ1 in the presence of
firm risk aversion. Differently from point (i), the regulator promotes high effort under vertical
integration (Eh [t
c
vi] < ∆ν∆S) and low effort under vertical separation (Eh [t
c
vs] ≥ ∆ν∆S).
Therefore, the upstream firm and a downstream firm prefer to vertically integrate, and the
regulator stimulates high effort at a lower social cost.
As point (iii) of Proposition 1 reveals, when the cost of high effort is so large that low effort
is socially desirable irrespective of the vertical industry structure, i.e., min {Eh [t
c
vi] ,Eh [t
c
vs]} ≥
∆ν∆S, the regulator induces low effort and provides zero transfers. This implies that the firms
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(and the regulator) are indifferent about the vertical industry structure.
The results in Proposition 1 are related to the literature about the optimal institutional
design of regulated industries in the presence of asymmetric information. In a setting where
production requires complementary inputs in fixed proportions (as in vertically related mar-
kets) and the cost of each input is privately known by its supplier, Baron and Besanko (1992)
and Gilbert and Riordan (1995) show that, under relevant circumstances, vertically integrated
supply leads to higher welfare than component supply. The reason is that under component
supply each firm is charged with the provision of a different input and does not internalize the
negative externality of its actions on the other firm. This magnifies the firm’s incentives to
exaggerate input costs in order to obtain larger remuneration from the regulator. Along these
lines, Severinov (2008) demonstrates that integrated supply increases welfare with respect to
component supply if the degree of complementarity between inputs is not too large. Incorpo-
rating firm risk aversion into the model of Gilbert and Riordan (1995), Li (2010) shows that
integrated supply still generates higher welfare than component supply as long as the degree of
firm risk aversion is sufficiently small. In the spirit of the existing literature, we also find that
vertical integration is socially desirable in a relevant number of cases, because it relaxes the
regulator’s incentive problem. As discussed after Proposition 1, this occurs when the cost of
high effort is not significantly large and the degree of firm risk aversion is small enough (which
makes the condition ψ < ψ1 more likely to hold). Remarkably, we endogenize the firms’ deci-
sion whether to vertically integrate or not. As a consequence, even under these circumstances,
vertical separation can emerge in equilibrium.
3.2 Regulatory risk
We now turn to the investigation of a general regulatory regime that allows for regulatory risk.
This is formalized through the probability α ∈ [0, 1] that the regulator enforces the regulatory
policy offered prior to the investment stage. With complementary probability 1−α, the regula-
tory policy is not enforced and the regulator offers a new, sequentially optimal policy after the
regulated firm’s investment costs have been sunk. The sequentially optimal policy prescribes
the lowest (socially costly) transfer compatible with the regulated firm’s limited liability irre-
spective of the investment outcome, i.e., t = t = 0. Our specification of regulatory risk is in line
with some relevant theoretical and empirical contributions (e.g., Armstrong and Vickers 1996;
Cambini et al. 2012; Iossa and Martimort 2015; Panteghini and Scarpa 2008; Woroch 1988).
Analyzing partial commitment in debt contracts, Kovrijnykh (2013) adopts the same formula-
tion to capture the probability of contractual enforcement. Strausz (2011) models regulatory
risk as mean-preserving spreads of the regulator’s policy variables. In the subsequent analysis,
we show that our approach is consistent with Strausz’s (2011) characterization of regulatory
risk. Interestingly, Strausz (2011, p. 759) identifies the uncertainty about the regulator’s com-
mitment as an alternative formulation of regulatory risk that constitutes a fruitful direction for
future research.
As discussed after Lemma 1, with the probability α = 0 of regulatory enforcement, under
vertical separation the upstream firm anticipates zero transfers with certainty and therefore
provides low effort. It follows from Assumption 1 that for α = 0 low effort is also exerted under
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vertical integration because the cost of high effort exceeds the expected increase in the down-
stream utility arising from the investment. Given that the moral hazard problem is essentially
associated with the provision of high effort, we restrict our attention to α ∈ (0, 1]. Any proba-
bility α ∈ (0, 1) of regulatory enforcement involves regulatory risk.10 Note that, when exerting
effort, the regulated firm now faces two layers of uncertainty. As under full commitment, the
firm does not know the realization of the investment outcome. In addition, the regulatory pol-
icy may be revised after the investment costs have been incurred. In the sequel, we show that
introducing this second layer of uncertainty — i.e., regulatory risk — can be welfare enhancing.
In the spirit of the backward induction logic, we treat the probability α of regulatory enforce-
ment as exogenous in the following analysis. Then, we derive the value for α that generates the
highest welfare.
Under vertical separation, if the regulator wishes to induce high effort, the upstream firm’s
(expected) utility from high effort must exceed the corresponding utility from low effort. The
moral hazard incentive constraint writes as
αEh [Π
e
u] + (1− α)Eh [Π
ne
u ] ≥ αEl [Π
e
u] + (1− α)El [Π
ne
u ] . (4)
With probability α, the regulatory policy is enforced and the upstream firm receives expected
utility Eh [Π
e
u] from high effort and El [Π
e
u] from low effort. With complementary probability
1 − α, the regulatory policy is not enforced and a new, sequentially optimal policy is offered
by the regulator. This gives the upstream firm expected utility Eh [Π
ne
u ] from high effort and
El [Π
ne
u ] from low effort.
Under vertical integration, when the regulator wants to promote high effort, the moral
hazard incentive constraint becomes
αEh [Π
e
vi] + (1− α)Eh [Π
ne
vi ] ≥ αEl [Π
e
vi] + (1− α)El [Π
ne
vi ] . (5)
If the regulatory policy is enforced (which occurs with probability α), the vertically integrated
firm obtains (expected) utility Eh [Π
e
vi] from high effort and El [Π
e
vi] from low effort. If the reg-
ulatory policy is not enforced and a new, sequentially optimal policy is offered by the regulator
(which occurs with complementary probability 1−α), the vertically integrated firm’s (expected)
utility is Eh [Π
ne
vi ] from high effort and El [Π
ne
vi ] from low effort.
If investment has failed, the regulated firm receives the lowest (socially costly) transfer com-
patible with limited liability in the two vertical industry structures. This holds irrespective of
whether the regulatory policy offered prior to the investment stage is enforced or not. Therefore,
the limited liability constraint is binding in equilibrium, and the regulated firm obtains zero
transfers in case of investment failure. If investment has succeeded, the regulated firm’s remu-
neration that induces high effort depends on the enforcement of the regulatory policy. With
probability α, the regulatory policy is enforced, and the equilibrium transfers under vertical
separation and vertical integration are respectively designed so that the moral hazard incentive
constraints (4) and (5) are binding in equilibrium. With probability 1−α, the regulatory policy
10As Strausz (2011, p. 743) emphasizes, regulatory risk crucially differs from regulatory opportunism in the
form of no commitment (α = 0). The reason is that regulatory risk entails uncertainty about future regulatory
changes, while under no commitment the firm can fully anticipate these changes.
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is not enforced and the new, sequentially optimal policy yields zero transfers. Anticipating a
positive transfer in case of investment success only with probability α, in each vertical industry
structure the regulated firm commands larger compensation than under full commitment, unless
α = 1. Clearly, an increase in the cost of high effort ψ leads to higher expected transfers. In
the following lemma, we investigate the impact of the probability α of regulatory enforcement
upon the expected transfers that induce high effort in the two vertical industry structures.
Lemma 3 It holds ∂Eh[t
r
vs]
∂α
≤ 0 and
∂Eh[trvi]
∂α
≤ 0, where the strict inequalities follow under firm
risk aversion (u′′ (·) < 0).
Lemma 3 indicates that the expected transfers Eh [t
r
vs] and Eh [t
r
vi] that promote high effort
in the presence of regulatory risk are independent of the probability α of regulatory enforce-
ment under firm risk neutrality, but they decrease with α under firm risk aversion. Hence, a
risk-neutral firm is indifferent about the degree of regulatory risk. However, a risk-averse firm
commands a larger expected transfer when α decreases. Since the transfer is zero with probabil-
ity 1−α, the transfer provided with probability α (in case of investment success) must increase
when α declines in order to ensure a given expected value. Therefore, for a given mean, the
variance of transfers decreases with α. Specifically, a distribution of transfers with low α is a
mean-preserving spread of a distribution of transfers with high α. This implies that a reduction
in α aggravates the risk borne by the firm. As Lemma 3 establishes, the firm requires a larger
(expected) transfer when α becomes smaller. In our setting, the probability α can be interpreted
as an inverse measure of regulatory risk. This shares some similarities with Strausz’s (2011)
formulation of regulatory risk as mean-preserving spreads of the regulator’s policy variables.
While in Strausz (2011) regulatory risk is unalterable and exogenous, we aim at deriving the
optimal degree of regulatory risk.
Lemma 3 delivers two relevant implications. Under firm risk neutrality, the magnitude of
regulatory risk is inconsequential, because the expected transfer to the regulated firm does not
depend on the probability α of regulatory enforcement. Therefore, any degree of regulatory risk
generates the same welfare. Things change significantly in the presence of firm risk aversion.
For a given vertical industry structure, full regulatory commitment (α = 1) minimizes the
expected transfer that the regulated firm requires, because regulatory risk is fully removed.
The establishment of a regulator with full commitment powers would be welfare enhancing. In
the following proposition, we show that, when the vertical industry structure is endogenized,
some degree of regulatory risk can be socially beneficial.
Proposition 2 Suppose Eh [t
c
vs] < ∆ν∆S and firm risk aversion (u
′′ (·) < 0). Then, there
exists a threshold ψ∗, with ψ0 < ψ
∗ < ψ1, such that for ψ < ψ
∗ some degree of regulatory risk
is optimal. The equilibrium probability of regulatory enforcement is α∗ ∈ (0, 1), where α∗ is
the unique value for α such that Eh [t
r
vs (α
∗)] = ∆ν∆S. Vertical integration emerges, and high
investment effort is provided.
To appreciate the rationale for this result as substantiated in the introduction, it is helpful
to consider the conditions stated in Proposition 2, i.e., Eh [t
c
vs] < ∆ν∆S and ψ < ψ
∗, where
ψ∗ is defined by (A16) in the Appendix. As ψ∗ < ψ1, it follows from Lemma 2 that Eh [t
c
vi] <
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α0
Eh [t
r
vi]
Eh [t
r
vs]
∆ν∆S
1α1 α3 α2 = α
∗
Eh [t
c
vs] < ∆ν∆S. In this case, under full commitment, the regulator prefers vertical integration
that entails a lower expected transfer to the regulated firm (Eh [t
c
vi] < Eh [t
c
vs]). However,
Proposition 1 indicates that vertical separation emerges in equilibrium. Anticipating that high
effort is induced irrespective of the vertical industry structure and that the expected transfer is
higher under vertical separation (Eh [t
c
vi] < Eh [t
c
vs] < ∆ν∆S), the firms obtain higher (expected)
aggregate utility under vertical separation than under vertical integration and therefore they
prefer to remain vertically separated. We know from Lemma 3 that, in the presence of firm
risk aversion, the expected transfers Eh [t
r
vs] and Eh [t
r
vi] decrease with the probability α of
regulatory enforcement. This means that regulatory risk reduces the social desirability of high
effort. As Figure 1 illustrates, if α1 < α ≤ α2, high effort is still socially beneficial under
vertical integration (Eh [t
r
vi] < ∆ν∆S) but not under vertical separation (Eh [t
r
vs] ≥ ∆ν∆S).
Anticipating this, the upstream firm and a downstream firm now find vertical integration more
profitable. The vertically integrated firm’s internalization of the downstream payoff mitigates
the moral hazard problem and stimulates upstream investment at a lower social cost. As the
expected transfer decreases with α, the optimal degree of regulatory risk is determined by the
highest probability of regulatory enforcement α∗ = α2 such that low effort would be only exerted
under vertical separation, i.e., Eh [t
r
vs (α
∗)] = ∆ν∆S.
The conditions Eh [t
c
vs] < ∆ν∆S and ψ < ψ
∗, with ψ0 < ψ
∗ < ψ1, stated in Proposition
2 imply that regulatory risk is socially optimal for intermediate costs of effort. In particular,
the condition ψ < ψ∗ ensures that the expected transfer in the presence of regulatory risk
is lower than the expected transfer under full commitment. To gain some intuition, recall
from Lemma 3 that, for a given vertical industry structure, full commitment yields the lowest
(expected) transfer to the regulated firm. As previously discussed, we have Eh [t
c
vi] < Eh [t
c
vs] <
∆ν∆S, which implies that under full commitment high effort is promoted irrespective of the
vertical industry structure and therefore vertical separation emerges. Regulatory risk generates
higher welfare than full commitment if and only if vertical integration driven by regulatory risk
stimulates upstream investment with a lower (expected) transfer compared to vertical separation
driven by full commitment, i.e., Eh [t
r
vi (α
∗)] < Eh [t
c
vs]. As Figure 1 illustrates, this requires
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that the interval α3 < α ≤ α2 is nonempty, where α3 is such that Eh [t
r
vi (α3)] = Eh [t
c
vs]. We
know from the analysis after Lemma 2 that, under firm risk aversion, the transfers increase with
the cost of effort to a larger extent under vertical integration than under vertical separation.
As shown in the proof of Proposition 2 in the Appendix, there exists a threshold ψ∗ for the cost
of effort such that Eh [t
r
vi (α
∗)] < Eh [t
c
vs] if and only if ψ < ψ
∗. This implies that the interval
α3 < α ≤ α2 is nonempty and regulatory risk is social welfare enhancing.
11 The threshold ψ∗
depends on the degree of firm risk aversion. It turns out that regulatory risk is more likely
to be socially optimal under firm small risk aversion. For a high degree of risk aversion, the
regulated firm commands large remuneration in the presence of regulatory risk, which makes
full commitment socially preferable.
Given that Eh [t
r
vs (α
∗)] = ∆ν∆S, differentiating α∗ with respect to ψ yields
∂α∗
∂ψ
= −
∂Eh[t
r
vs]
∂ψ
∂Eh[trvs]
∂α
> 0,
where the inequality follows from ∂Eh[t
r
vs]
∂ψ
> 0 and ∂Eh[t
r
vs]
∂α
< 0 (see Lemma 3). To understand
why, note that an increase in the cost of high effort ψ leads to a higher expected transfer
Eh [t
r
vs (·)]. As Eh [t
r
vs (·)] decreases with α, the equilibrium probability α
∗ of regulatory enforce-
ment must increase in order to ensure that Eh [t
r
vs (α
∗)] = ∆ν∆S. Therefore, a higher cost of
investment effort mitigates the scope for regulatory risk.
In the following proposition, we consider the situation where regulatory risk is no longer
optimal.
Proposition 3 Suppose that the conditions Eh [t
c
vs] < ∆ν∆S and ψ < ψ
∗ stated in Proposition
2 do not simultaneously hold. Moreover, suppose firm risk aversion (u′′ (·) < 0).
(i) If either Eh [t
c
vi] ≤ Eh [t
c
vs] < ∆ν∆S and ψ > ψ
∗ or Eh [t
c
vs] < min {Eh [t
c
vi] ,∆ν∆S}, the
equilibrium probability of regulatory enforcement is α∗ = 1. Vertical separation emerges, and
high investment effort is provided.
(ii) If Eh [t
c
vi] < ∆ν∆S ≤ Eh [t
c
vs], the equilibrium probability of regulatory enforcement is
α∗ = 1. Vertical integration emerges, and high investment effort is provided.
(iii) Otherwise, i.e., if min {Eh [t
c
vi] ,Eh [t
c
vs]} ≥ ∆ν∆S, the equilibrium probability of regula-
tory enforcement is any α∗ ∈ [0, 1]. The vertical industry structure is inconsequential, and low
investment effort is provided.
The results in Propositions 2 and 3 are summarized in Table 2. Points (i) and (ii) of
Proposition 3 indicate the conditions under which the establishment of a regulator with full
commitment powers is socially optimal, and therefore the equilibrium probability of regulatory
enforcement is α∗ = 1. Specifically, under the conditions in point (i), full regulatory commitment
is optimal and vertical separation emerges in equilibrium. This outcome reflects the one in
point (i) of Proposition 1. Consider first the case where Eh [t
c
vi] ≤ Eh [t
c
vs] < ∆ν∆S and
ψ > ψ∗. It follows from the discussion after Proposition 2 that regulatory risk involves a higher
expected transfer than full commitment. Hence, larger costs of investment effort (ψ > ψ∗)
make full commitment more socially desirable than regulatory risk. Although the regulator
11A fortiori, the interval α1 < α ≤ α2 previously discussed is also nonempty.
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Expected transfers regulatory regime industry structure investment
Eh [t
c
vs] < ∆ν∆S and ψ < ψ
∗ α∗ ∈ (0, 1) vertical integration high
Eh [t
c
vi] ≤ Eh [t
c
vs] < ∆ν∆S and ψ > ψ
∗
or Eh [t
c
vs] < min {Eh [t
c
vi] ,∆ν∆S}
α∗ = 1 vertical separation high
Eh [t
c
vi] < ∆ν∆S ≤ Eh [t
c
vs] α
∗ = 1 vertical integration high
min {Eh [t
c
vi] ,Eh [t
c
vs]} ≥ ∆ν∆S any α
∗ ∈ [0, 1]
vertical integration
or vertical separation
low
Table 2: Main results
prefers vertical integration (Eh [t
c
vi] ≤ Eh [t
c
vs]), the firms opt for vertical separation, because
high effort is promoted irrespective of the vertical industry structure and vertical separation
ensures a higher expected transfer (Eh [t
c
vi] ≤ Eh [t
c
vs] < ∆ν∆S). Now, consider the case where
Eh [t
c
vs] < min {Eh [t
c
vi] ,∆ν∆S}. We know from the analysis after Proposition 1 that under full
commitment the interests of the regulator are aligned with those of the firms in favor of vertical
separation. Anticipating that high effort will be incentivized at least under vertical separation
(Eh [t
c
vs] < ∆ν∆S), the firms prefer to be vertically separated. The regulator is also better off
under vertical separation (Eh [t
c
vs] < Eh [t
c
vi]). Full regulatory commitment is optimal, because
upstream transfers are minimized. Given that Eh [t
c
vs] < min {Eh [t
c
vi] ,∆ν∆S} implies ψ > ψ1
(see Lemma 2), this outcome is more likely to emerge for a larger degree of firm risk aversion.
Point (ii) of Proposition 3 shows that, if Eh [t
c
vi] < ∆ν∆S ≤ Eh [t
c
vs], full regulatory commit-
ment is optimal and vertical integration emerges in equilibrium. This outcome corresponds
to the one in point (ii) of Proposition 1. Under full commitment, the regulator and the
firms share the same preferences for vertical integration. Anticipating that high effort will
be incentivized under vertical integration (Eh [t
c
vi] < ∆ν∆S) but not under vertical separa-
tion (Eh [t
c
vs] ≥ ∆ν∆S), the firms want to vertically integrate. The regulator also prefers
vertical integration (Eh [t
c
vi] < Eh [t
c
vs]). As in point (i) of Proposition 3, full regulatory
commitment is optimal because it minimizes the amount of upstream transfers. Given that
Eh [t
c
vi] < ∆ν∆S ≤ Eh [t
c
vs] implies ψ < ψ1, this outcome tends to emerge when firm risk
aversion is relatively small.
Point (iii) of Proposition 3 reveals that, in line with the outcome in point (iii) of Proposi-
tion 1, if min {Eh [t
c
vi] ,Eh [t
c
vs]} ≥ ∆ν∆S, the cost of high effort is so large that low effort is
incentivized irrespective of the vertical industry structure. As upstream transfers are zero, the
regulatory regime and the vertical industry structure become inconsequential.
4 Illustrative example
To provide additional results in a setting with explicit functions, we now consider a constant
absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility function of the form
u(x) =
{
1−e−ρx
ρ
if ρ > 0
x if ρ = 0
, (6)
where x ≥ 0 is the payoff and ρ ≥ 0 measures the degree of absolute risk aversion, with ρ = 0
in case of risk neutrality. We assume that there are N ≥ 2 downstream firms competing a`
la Cournot and facing the (inverse) consumer demand function P (Q) = 1 − Q, where P (·) is
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the unit market price and Q the aggregate quantity. The upstream firm’s investment affects
the performance of downstream firms. In particular, a successful investment leads to lower
downstream marginal costs than in case of failure, i.e., 0 ≤ c < c < 1 and ∆c ≡ c − c > 0.
Intuitively, our qualitative results still hold when the upstream investment influences other
features of the downstream market, such as the quality of the good and the associated consumer
willingness to pay. The following remark applies the result of Proposition 2 to this setting.
Remark 1 Suppose Eh [t
c
vs] < ∆ν∆S and firm risk aversion (ρ > 0). Then, there exists a
threshold ψ∗, with ψ0 < ψ
∗ < ψ1, such that for ψ < ψ
∗ some degree of regulatory risk is
optimal. The equilibrium probability of regulatory enforcement is α∗ ∈ (0, 1), where α∗ is the
unique value for α such that
νhα
∗ ln
(
1−
ρψ
α∗∆ν
)
+ ρ∆ν
(2− c− c)N2∆c
2 (1 +N)2
= 0. (7)
Vertical integration emerges, and high investment effort is provided.
As ψ∗ > ψ0, there exists a nonempty interval for the cost of high effort ψ where regulatory
risk is socially optimal if and only if ψ > ψ0 and Eh [t
c
vs] < ∆ν∆S. As formally shown in the
proof of Remark 1 in the Appendix, in a downstream duopoly market (N = 2) the probability
of investment success with high effort must be twice larger than the corresponding probability
with low effort, i.e., νh > 2νl, provided that the degree of firm risk aversion ρ is small enough.
This indicates that regulatory risk tends to arise exactly when the investment benefits are
significantly more likely to materialize in response to high effort and therefore the promotion of
investment effort is more socially valuable. If competition in the downstream market is more
intense (N > 2), the condition for regulatory risk to emerge in equilibrium is relaxed. As will
become clear in the sequel, the scope for regulatory risk becomes larger when the downstream
market is more competitive.
Using the definition of α∗ in (7), the following remark provides comparative statics results
of some interest.
Remark 2 It holds ∂α
∗
∂N
< 0 and ∂α
∗
∂ρ
> 0.
Remark 2 shows that the equilibrium probability α∗ of regulatory enforcement decreases
with the number N of downstream firms. To gain some intuition, it is helpful to recall from
Proposition 2 that in equilibrium we have Eh [t
r
vs (α
∗)] = ∆ν∆S. More severe competition
increases the (expected) consumer surplus gain associated with a successful investment, i.e.,
∂∆ν∆S
∂N
> 0. Hence, Eh [t
r
vs (α
∗)] must rise in order to ensure that Eh [t
r
vs (α
∗)] = ∆ν∆S.
As Eh [t
r
vs (·)] decreases with α (see Lemma 3), the equilibrium probability α
∗ of regulatory
enforcement becomes lower. In line with the discussion after Remark 1, a higher degree of
regulatory risk is socially desirable when downstream competition is tougher.
Naturally, α∗ increases with the degree of firm risk aversion ρ. A more risk-averse firm
asks for larger (expected) compensation in the face of uncertainty, which reduces the social
desirability of regulatory risk.
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5 Robustness and extensions
5.1 Access pricing
In our model we assume that the upstream firm receives a transfer from the regulator, abstract-
ing from the explicit formulation of the price that the upstream firm may charge to downstream
firms for the input access. Our results carry over to a more general setting that allows for the
regulation of the input access price. To fix ideas, suppose that the regulator offers the upstream
firm a two-part tariff (a, T ), where a is the unit access price paid by downstream firms and T
is the transfer provided by the regulator. The upstream input is converted with a one-to-one
technology into a final product supplied in the downstream market. Under vertical separation,
the upstream firm’s utility becomes
Πau = u (T + aQ)− ψe, (8)
whereQ denotes the downstream aggregate quantity. As in the baseline model, each downstream
firm obtains a payoff pi ≥ 0 and associated utility u (pi), where pi ∈ {pi, pi} and pi > pi. For
instance, a successful investment reduces input costs and leads to a lower access price.
The vertically integrated firm’s utility is given by
Πavi = u (T + aQ+ pi)− ψe. (9)
In accordance with the most common regulatory practices, the downstream division of the verti-
cally integrated firm pays the same input access price as rivals, although this constitutes a mere
transfer within the vertical chain. Defining t ≡ T +aQ, the vertically separated upstream firm’s
utility in (8) and the vertically integrated firm’s utility in (9) reduce to (1) and (2), respectively.
The regulated firm is indifferent to whether its upstream revenues stem from the access price
paid by downstream firms or from the transfer provided by the regulator. As long as the regu-
lated firm’s rents are socially costly, the regulator’s problem is to minimize the transfer t, in line
with the baseline model. The only difference is that the access price may affect the outcome in
the downstream market. However, in practice the access price does not vary substantially with
the vertical industry structure. This is because the access price is usually based on the input
marginal costs, irrespective of whether the upstream firm is vertically integrated or not. Even
when the access price may differ according to the vertical industry structure, our qualitative
results are still valid. To see this, suppose that the optimal access price under vertical separa-
tion is also implemented under vertical integration. As mentioned in Section 2, the standard
regulatory practice of legal unbundling implies that the vertically integrated firm’s downstream
division operates in the competitive market as under vertical separation (e.g., Cremer and De
Donder 2013; Fiocco 2012; Ho¨ﬄer and Kranz 2011; Sibley and Weisman 1998). Hence, the im-
plementation of the same access price generates the same upstream revenues from access pricing
in the two vertical industry structures. Our analysis shows that some degree of regulatory risk is
optimal when vertical integration driven by regulatory risk leads to a lower (expected) upstream
transfer compared to vertical separation driven by full regulatory commitment. Given that the
upstream revenues from access pricing are the same in the two vertical industry structures for
a given access price, regulatory risk is optimal as long as it reduces the (expected) upstream
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transfer net of the revenues from access pricing, consistently with the baseline model. A for-
tiori, regulatory risk is welfare superior when the optimal access price is chosen under vertical
integration.
5.2 Discriminatory activities
Throughout the analysis, the vertically integrated firm cannot favor its division in the down-
stream market. This reflects the fundamental rules of the regulatory regimes worldwide, which
prohibit any sort of the vertically integrated firm’s discriminatory activities at the expense of
downstream rivals. Although input price discrimination is generally unfeasible, in practice a
vertically integrated firm may not be prevented from engaging in non-price discrimination or
“sabotage” against rivals, such as input quality degradation and concealment of crucial informa-
tion (e.g., Economides 1998; Ho¨ﬄer and Kranz 2011; Mandy and Sappington 2007; Sand 2004).
Discrimination generally increases the downstream returns but reduces the upstream returns of
the vertically integrated firm. When the benefits dominate the costs, discriminatory activities
enhance the profitability of vertical integration. The likelihood of discrimination is an empir-
ical issue and varies with the industry at hand (e.g., Mandy and Sappington 2007). Clearly,
discrimination is welfare detrimental and reduces the social desirability of vertical integration.
Given that regulatory risk makes vertical integration more profitable, our analysis suggests that
regulatory risk should be accompanied by more severe regulatory deterrence policies against the
vertically integrated firm’s potential discriminatory activities.
5.3 Efficiency gains
A common reason for vertical integration is the realization of efficiency gains from joint produc-
tion within the vertical chain. These benefits must be traded off against possible losses, such as
diseconomies of firm size and legal costs associated with vertical integration. Efficiency gains
may generate higher social welfare, for instance in the form of lower final prices that make con-
sumers better off. Moreover, the regulator can capture (a portion of) efficiency gains by setting
a lower upstream transfer to the vertically integrated firm. In line with the baseline model,
some degree of regulatory risk is socially desirable because it facilitates vertical integration.
6 Determinants of regulatory risk
In his exhaustive work about the determinants of regulatory risk, Pedell (2006, p. 54) emphasizes
that “[r]egulatory risk can be traced back to the design variables of rate regulation as ultimate
causes. Differences in the design of regulation are reflected in different effects on the risk of the
regulated firm”.12 As also pointed out by Guthrie (2006), the regulatory design variables are
primarily determined by the institutional and legal system where the regulator operates. The
essential feature of regulatory risk is the uncertainty about the regulator’s future behavior, which
affects the probability distribution of the regulated firm’s cash flows. Hence, regulatory risk is
intimately related to the regulator’s commitment powers and to the extension of regulatory
12Kolbe et al. (1993) provide an earlier comprehensive analysis of regulatory risk.
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discretion. It has been well established in the US judicial system since the Supreme Court
decision of Smyth v. Ames (169 US 466, 1898) that a regulated firm is entitled to a “fair
return upon the value of that which it employs for the public convenience”. However, the
exact definition of a “fair return” is not provided, which gives scope for some degree of ex post
regulatory flexibility. More broadly, regulatory risk is associated with the degree of contractual
enforcement. As empirically documented by La Porta et al. (1998), contractual enforcement
differs across countries according to their legal system. French civil-law countries exhibit a lower
degree of enforcement than Scandinavian and German civil-law countries as well as common-law
countries.
Legal provisions about the recovery of the investment costs generate different degrees of
regulatory risk. The regulated firm is usually allowed to recover either the costs of “used-and-
useful” assets, which satisfy consumer demand from a current point of view, or the “prudently”
incurred costs, whose assessment is conditional upon the information available at the time of in-
vestment. In the case Duquesne Light Company v. Barasch (488 US 299, 1989), the US Supreme
Court explicitly identified as a class of regulatory risk the future regulatory disallowance of the
investment costs deemed unused and unuseful from an ex post perspective. Along these lines,
the regulator’s adoption of “replacement costs” (based on the latest available technology) in-
stead of “historical costs” (actually incurred by the firm) introduces an additional element of
regulatory risk associated with the uncertainty about technological progress and the (discre-
tionary) regulatory inspection of the investment costs in the light of the latest technology.13
Regulatory risk is also affected by the timing of regulatory reviews. The typical lifetime of an
investment asset in infrastructure industries is longer than the regulatory review period, which
leads to the risk of future regulatory revisions about the reimbursement of investment costs.14
The complexity of administrative procedures and the consumers’ entitlement to exert pressure
for a regulatory change contribute to the magnitude of regulatory risk, along with the turnover
of the regulatory staff.
7 Concluding remarks
The uncertainty about future regulation — known as regulatory risk — has been systematically
documented in regulated industries. In the popular debate, regulatory risk is perceived as
welfare detrimental because it deters investment activities. In this paper, we investigate the
role of regulatory risk in a vertically related market where an upstream regulated firm decides
whether to vertically integrate and exerts unobservable investment effort for the provision of an
essential input to downstream competitors. Contrary to the common view, we find that, under
certain circumstances, some degree of regulatory risk is ex ante socially beneficial. This occurs
for moderate costs of investment effort and firm small risk aversion. The driving force for this
13A prominent example is the total element long run incremental cost (TELRIC) regulatory measure, which is
extensively used in the US telecommunications industry. An analogous measure based on the costs of the efficient
service provision is applied in German telecommunications.
14Some regulatory regimes explicitly incorporate flexibility even during the regulatory period. In the UK gas
and electricity sectors, the length of the regulatory period is currently eight years, with a potential mid-period
review. See Decker (2015) and the references cited therein for further details about the length of regulatory
period in different sectors and countries.
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apparently counterintuitive result lies in the channel identified by our analysis that connects
regulatory risk with vertical integration and upstream investment. A risk-averse firm commands
larger compensation in response to regulatory risk, which reduces the social desirability of high
investment effort with respect to full commitment, where regulatory risk is absent. For moderate
costs of investment effort, differently from full commitment, the regulator prefers to promote
high effort only under vertical integration. This is because the vertically integrated firm’s
internalization of the downstream payoff alleviates the moral hazard problem associated with
unobservable investment effort and reduces the amount of the upstream transfer compared to
vertical separation. In anticipation of the regulator’s behavior toward investment effort, vertical
integration becomes more profitable, which spurs upstream investment at a lower social cost.
As a more risk-averse firm is more reluctant to operate in the face of uncertainty, regulatory
risk tends to be socially optimal under firm small risk aversion.
Our work sheds new light on some empirically documented determinants of vertical integra-
tion. Fan et al. (2017) show that vertical integration is more common in regions where legal
institutions are characterized by a lower degree of contractual enforcement, which creates some
institutional uncertainty. We provide theoretical corroboration for the identification of regula-
tory risk as a source of institutional uncertainty that facilitates vertical integration. Our results
are also consistent with the empirical findings of Garfinkel and Hankins (2011) that indicate the
positive effect of uncertainty about firms’ cash flows upon vertical integration and illustrate the
role of risk management in the firms’ incentives to vertically integrate. Our analysis provides
further support for the well-established empirical evidence about the relevance of upstream
effort to vertical integration (Lafontaine and Slade 2007). Remarkably, some empirical contri-
butions show that regulatory risk is not necessarily an impediment to firms’ investments (e.g.,
Buckland and Fraser 2001a, 2001b; Hoffmann et al. 2009; Lyon and Mayo 2005). The empir-
ical studies that establish the existence of underinvestment associated with limited regulatory
commitment powers typically abstract from the process of vertical integration (e.g., Lim and
Yurukoglu 2018). In our setting, for a given vertical industry structure, full regulatory com-
mitment is socially optimal, in line with these empirical studies. However, our results indicate
that things change significantly if the choice of vertical integration is considered. Therefore, our
analysis advocates that vertical integration should be endogenized in order to investigate the
effects of limited commitment and regulatory risk on investment activities.
According to the estimates provided by Oxford Economics (2017), the average annual in-
vestment spending required in the US for the following decades (using prices in 2015) is rather
large for electricity (130 billion dollars), takes intermediate values for airports, telecommunica-
tions and rail (26.7, 25.5 and 18.7 billion dollars, respectively), while it is relatively small for
water (7.9 billion dollars). In the light of our result that regulatory risk is optimal in sectors
characterized by intermediate investment costs, these estimates suggest that some level of regu-
latory risk is likely to be welfare enhancing in sectors such as airports, telecommunications and
rail. Since we find that the scope for regulatory risk increases with the intensity of downstream
competition, the liberalization process of downstream activities can be accompanied by a higher
degree of regulatory risk. The predictions of our model are suitable to be empirically validated
and can contribute to the policy debate about vertically related markets.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Suppose that the probability of regulatory enforcement is α = 0. This
implies that the regulator certainly gives the regulated firm the lowest transfer compatible with
limited liability irrespective of the investment outcome, i.e., t = t = 0. Using (1), under vertical
separation the upstream firm exerts low effort instead of high effort. This is because low effort
yields zero profits, while high effort entails a loss equal to ψ > 0. Using (2), under vertical
integration the moral hazard incentive constraint Eh [Πvi] ≥ El [Πvi] is given by
νhu (pi) + (1− νh)u (pi)− ψ ≥ νlu (pi) + (1− νl)u (pi) ,
which is satisfied if and only if ψ ≤ ψ0, where ψ0 ≡ ∆ν [u (pi)− u (pi)]. As El [Πvi] = El [Πvs],
we find that for ψ ≤ ψ0 vertical integration (which induces high effort) is more profitable than
vertical separation (which induces low effort). Given that the regulator obtains high effort
with zero transfers, the vertical integration decision is welfare enhancing and the equilibrium
probability of regulatory enforcement is α∗ = 0. Expected social welfare is νhS + (1− νh)S.
Proof of Lemma 2. Using (1), the moral hazard incentive constraint Eh [Πu] ≥ El [Πu] under
vertical separation is given by
νhu
(
t
)
+ (1− νh)u (t)− ψ ≥ νlu
(
t
)
+ (1− νl)u (t) . (A1)
Since upstream transfers reduce social welfare in (3), the limited liability constraint t ≥ 0 in case
of investment failure and the moral hazard incentive constraint (A1) are binding in equilibrium.
Hence, under vertical separation, when high effort is incentivized, the full commitment transfers
are tcvs = 0 if investment has failed and t
c
vs = u
−1
(
ψ
∆ν
)
> 0 if investment has succeeded. The
function u−1 (·) is the inverse of u (·), where u−1 (0) = 0, u−1′ (·) > 0, and u−1′′ (·) ≥ 0 (with
u−1′′ (·) > 0 under risk aversion).
Using (2), the moral hazard incentive constraint Eh [Πvi] ≥ El [Πvi] under vertical integration
is given by
νhu
(
t+ pi
)
+ (1− νh)u (t+ pi)− ψ ≥ νlu
(
t+ pi
)
+ (1− νl)u (t+ pi) . (A2)
In line with the case of vertical separation, since upstream transfers are socially costly, the
limited liability constraint t ≥ 0 and the moral hazard incentive constraint (A2) are binding
in equilibrium. Therefore, under vertical integration, when high effort is incentivized, the full
commitment transfers are tcvi = 0 if investment has failed and t
c
vi = u
−1
(
ψ
∆ν + u (pi)
)
− pi if
investment has succeeded (t
c
vi > 0 by Assumption 1).
Let Eh [t
c
vs] ≡ νht
c
vs and Eh [t
c
vi] ≡ νht
c
vi, where t
c
vs = u
−1
(
ψ
∆ν
)
and t
c
vi = u
−1
(
ψ
∆ν + u (pi)
)
−
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pi. Then, we find that Eh [t
c
vi] < Eh [t
c
vs] if and only if
u−1
(
ψ
∆ν
+ u (pi)
)
− pi − u−1
(
ψ
∆ν
)
< 0.
This condition is unambiguously satisfied under risk neutrality (u′′ (·) = 0), as pi > pi. Now, we
turn to the case of risk aversion (u′′ (·) < 0). Differentiating Eh [t
c
vs] and Eh [t
c
vi] with respect to
ψ yields
∂Eh [t
c
vs]
∂ψ
=
νh
∆ν
u−1′
(
ψ
∆ν
)
and
∂Eh [t
c
vi]
∂ψ
=
νh
∆ν
u−1′
(
ψ
∆ν
+ u (pi)
)
.
It follows from
∂Eh[tcvi]
∂ψ
>
∂Eh[t
c
vs]
∂ψ
> 0 (as u−1′ (·) > 0 and u−1′′ (·) > 0) and Eh [t
c
vs]|ψ=ψ0 >
Eh [t
c
vi]|ψ=ψ0 = 0 (where ψ0 is defined in Lemma 1) that there exists a unique (possibly large)
threshold ψ1, with ψ1 > ψ0, such that Eh [t
c
vi] < Eh [t
c
vs] if and only if ψ < ψ1.
Proof of Proposition 1. Using (1), the vertically separated firms’ (expected) aggregate utility
Eh [Π
c
vs] from high effort can be written as
Eh [Π
c
vs] = νh
[
u
(
t
c
vs
)
+ u (pi)
]
+ (1− νh) [u (t
c
vs) + u (pi)]− ψ
= νl
ψ
∆ν
+ νhu (pi) + (1− νh)u (pi) , (A3)
where tcvs = 0 and t
c
vs = u
−1
(
ψ
∆ν
)
(see the proof of Lemma 2).
Using (2), the vertically integrated firm’s (expected) utility Eh [Π
c
vi] from high effort is given
by
Eh [Π
c
vi] = νhu
(
t
c
vi + pi
)
+ (1− νh)u (t
c
vi + pi)− ψ
= νl
ψ
∆ν
+ u (pi) , (A4)
where tcvi = 0 and t
c
vi = u
−1
(
ψ
∆ν + u (pi)
)
− pi (see the proof of Lemma 2).
Now, suppose that the regulator demands low effort. In this case, it suffices to set the
transfer at the lowest level compatible with the regulated firm’s limited liability irrespective of
the investment outcome, i.e., t = t = 0. It follows from the proof of Lemma 1 and Assumption
1 that low effort is provided in the two vertical industry structures. This yields
El [Π
c
vs] = El [Π
c
vi] = νlu (pi) + (1− νl)u (pi) . (A5)
Suppose first that Eh [t
c
vi] < Eh [t
c
vs]. The following three cases arise.
(I) Eh [t
c
vs] < ∆ν∆S. It follows from (3) that
Eh [W
c
vi] = νhS + (1− νh)S − Eh [t
c
vi] >
Eh [W
c
vs] = νhS + (1− νh)S − Eh [t
c
vs] >
El [W
c] = νlS + (1− νl)S.
Then, the regulator induces high effort irrespective of the vertical industry structure. Using
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(A3) and (A4), we find that
Eh [Π
c
vs] > Eh [Π
c
vi] ⇐⇒ u (pi)− u (pi) > 0, (A6)
where the inequality follows from pi > pi and u′ (·) > 0. Hence, vertical separation emerges in
equilibrium, and high effort is provided. Expected social welfare is Eh [W
c
vs] = νhS+(1− νh)S−
Eh [t
c
vs].
(II) Eh [t
c
vi] < ∆ν∆S ≤ Eh [t
c
vs]. It follows from (3) that
Eh [W
c
vi] = νhS + (1− νh)S − Eh [t
c
vi] > El [W
c] = νlS + (1− νl)S
and
Eh [W
c
vs] = νhS + (1− νh)S − Eh [t
c
vs] ≤ El [W
c] = νlS + (1− νl)S,
where the equality holds if and only if Eh [t
c
vs] = ∆ν∆S. Then, the regulator induces high effort
under vertical integration and low effort under vertical separation. Using (A4) and (A5), we
find that
Eh [Π
c
vi] > El [Π
c
vs] ⇐⇒ ψ > ∆ν [u (pi)− u (pi)] , (A7)
which holds by Assumption 1. Hence, vertical integration emerges in equilibrium, and high
effort is provided. Expected social welfare is Eh [W
c
vi] = νhS + (1− νh)S − Eh [t
c
vi].
(III) Eh [t
c
vi] ≥ ∆ν∆S. It follows from (3) that
El [W
c] = νlS + (1− νl)S ≥
Eh [W
c
vi] = νhS + (1− νh)S − Eh [t
c
vi] >
Eh [W
c
vs] = νhS + (1− νh)S − Eh [t
c
vs] ,
where the equality holds if and only if Eh [t
c
vi] = ∆ν∆S. Then, the regulator induces low effort
irrespective of the vertical industry structure. It follows from (A5) that the firms are indifferent
to the vertical industry structure. Expected social welfare is El [W
c] = νlS + (1− νl)S.
Now, suppose that Eh [t
c
vi] ≥ Eh [t
c
vs]. The following two cases arise.
(IV) Eh [t
c
vs] < ∆ν∆S. It follows from (3) that
Eh [W
c
vs] = νhS + (1− νh)S − Eh [t
c
vs] > El [W
c] = νlS + (1− νl)S.
This implies that high effort is incentivized at least under vertical separation. Using (A5), (A6)
and (A7), we obtain that
Eh [Π
c
vs] > Eh [Π
c
vi] > El [Π
c
vs] = El [Π
c
vi] .
Since high effort is incentivized at least under vertical separation, we find that vertical separation
emerges in equilibrium, and high effort is provided. Expected social welfare is Eh [W
c
vs] =
νhS + (1− νh)S − Eh [t
c
vs].
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(V) Eh [t
c
vs] ≥ ∆ν∆S. It follows from (3) that
El [W
c] = νlS + (1− νl)S ≥
Eh [W
c
vs] = νhS + (1− νh)S − Eh [t
c
vs] ≥
Eh [W
c
vi] = νhS + (1− νh)S − Eh [t
c
vi] ,
where the first equality holds if and only if Eh [t
c
vs] = ∆ν∆S and the second equality holds if
and only if Eh [t
c
vi] = Eh [t
c
vs]. Then, the regulator induces low effort irrespective of the vertical
industry structure. It follows from (A5) that the firms are indifferent about the vertical industry
structure. Expected social welfare is El [W
c] = νlS + (1− νl)S.
Point (i) of the proposition follows from cases (I) and (IV). Point (ii) of the proposition
follows from case (II). Point (iii) of the proposition follows from cases (III) and (V).
Proof of Lemma 3. Using (1), the moral hazard incentive constraint (4) under vertical
separation becomes
α
[
νhu
(
t
e)
+ (1− νh)u (t
e)
]
+ (1− α)
[
νhu
(
t
ne)
+ (1− νh)u (t
ne)
]
− ψ ≥
α
[
νlu
(
t
e)
+ (1− νl)u (t
e)
]
+ (1− α)
[
νlu
(
t
ne)
+ (1− νl)u (t
ne)
]
. (A8)
Since upstream transfers are socially costly, the limited liability constraints te ≥ 0 and tne ≥ 0
in case of investment failure and the moral hazard incentive constraint (A8) are binding in
equilibrium. With probability α, the regulatory policy is enforced, and the vertically separated
upstream firm obtains tevs = 0 in case of investment failure and t
e
vs = u
−1
(
ψ
α∆ν
)
> 0 in case of
success. With complementary probability 1 − α, the regulatory policy is not enforced and the
new, sequentially optimal policy yields tnevs = t
ne
vs = 0.
Using (2), the moral hazard incentive constraint (5) under vertical integration becomes
α
[
νhu
(
t
e
+ pi
)
+ (1− νh)u (t
e + pi)
]
+(1− α)
[
νhu
(
t
ne
+ pi
)
+ (1− νh)u (t
ne + pi)
]
− ψ ≥
α
[
νlu
(
t
e
+ pi
)
+ (1− νl)u (t
e + pi)
]
+(1− α)
[
νlu
(
t
ne
+ pi
)
+ (1− νl)u (t
ne + pi)
]
. (A9)
In line with the case of vertical separation, since upstream transfers are socially costly, the lim-
ited liability constraints te ≥ 0 and tne ≥ 0 in case of investment failure and the moral hazard in-
centive constraint (A9) are binding in equilibrium. With probability α, the vertically integrated
firm receives tevi = 0 in case of investment failure and t
e
vi = u
−1
(
ψ
α∆ν +
u(pi)−(1−α)u(pi)
α
)
− pi in
case of success (t
e
vi > 0 by Assumption 1). With complementary probability 1−α, the transfers
are tnevi = t
ne
vi = 0.
Taking the derivative of Eh [t
r
vs] ≡ ανht
e
vs, where t
e
vs = u
−1
(
ψ
α∆ν
)
, with respect to α yields
∂Eh [t
r
vs]
∂α
= νh
[
u−1
(
ψ
α∆ν
)
−
ψ
α∆ν
u−1′
(
ψ
α∆ν
)]
.
It holds ∂Eh[t
r
vs]
∂α
= 0 under risk neutrality (u′′ (·) = 0). To establish the sign of ∂Eh[t
r
vs]
∂α
under risk
aversion (u′′ (·) < 0), we investigate how ∂Eh[t
r
vs]
∂α
varies with ψ. We find that ∂Eh[t
r
vs]
∂α
∣∣∣
ψ=0
= 0
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and
∂2Eh [t
r
vs]
∂α∂ψ
= −
νhψ
α2∆ν2
u−1′′
(
ψ
α∆ν
)
< 0,
where the inequality follows from ψ > 0 and u−1′′ (·) > 0. This implies that ∂Eh[t
r
vs]
∂α
< 0.
Taking the derivative of Eh [t
r
vi] ≡ ανht
e
vi, where t
e
vi = u
−1
(
ψ
α∆ν +
u(pi)−(1−α)u(pi)
α
)
− pi, with
respect to α yields
∂Eh [t
r
vi]
∂α
= νh
[
u−1
(
ψ
α∆ν
+
u (pi)− (1− α)u (pi)
α
)
− pi −
(
ψ
α∆ν
−
u (pi)− u (pi)
α
)
×u−1′
(
ψ
α∆ν
+
u (pi)− (1− α)u (pi)
α
)]
.
It holds
∂Eh[trvi]
∂α
= 0 under risk neutrality (u′′ (·) = 0). To establish the sign of
∂Eh[trvi]
∂α
under risk
aversion (u′′ (·) < 0), we investigate how
∂Eh[trvi]
∂α
varies with ψ. We find that
∂Eh[trvi]
∂α
∣∣∣∣
ψ=ψ0
= 0
(where ψ0 is defined in Lemma 1) and
∂2Eh [t
r
vi]
∂α∂ψ
= −νh
ψ −∆ν [u (pi)− u (pi)]
α2∆ν2
u−1′′
(
ψ
α∆ν
+
u (pi)− (1− α)u (pi)
α
)
< 0,
where the inequality follows from ψ > ψ0 (by Assumption 1) and u
−1′′ (·) > 0. This implies
that
∂Eh[trvi]
∂α
< 0.
Proof of Proposition 2. Using (1) along with Eh [Π
e
vs] and Eh [Π
ne
vs ] (defined in Section 3.2),
the vertically separated firms’ (expected) aggregate utility Eh [Π
r
vs] ≡ αEh [Π
e
vs]+(1− α)Eh [Π
ne
vs ]
from high effort is given by
Eh [Π
r
vs] = α
{
νh
[
u
(
t
e
vs
)
+ u (pi)
]
+ (1− νh) [u (t
e
vs) + u (pi)]
}
+ (1− α)
{
νh
[
u
(
t
ne
vs
)
+ u (pi)
]
+ (1− νh) [u (t
ne
vs) + u (pi)]
}
− ψ
= νl
ψ
∆ν
+ νhu (pi) + (1− νh)u (pi) , (A10)
where t
e
vs = u
−1
(
ψ
α∆ν
)
and tevs = t
ne
vs = t
ne
vs = 0 (see the proof of Lemma 3).
Using (2) along with Eh [Π
e
vi] and Eh [Π
ne
vi ] (defined in Section 3.2), the vertically integrated
firm’s (expected) utility Eh [Π
r
vi] ≡ αEh [Π
e
vi] + (1− α)Eh [Π
ne
vi ] from high effort is given by
Eh [Π
r
vi] = α
[
νhu
(
t
e
vi + pi
)
+ (1− νh)u (t
e
vi + pi)
]
+ (1− α)
[
νhu
(
t
ne
vi + pi
)
+ (1− νh)u (t
ne
vi + pi)
]
− ψ
= νl
ψ
∆ν
+ u (pi) , (A11)
where t
e
vi = u
−1
(
ψ
α∆ν +
u(pi)−(1−α)u(pi)
α
)
− pi and tevi = t
ne
vi = t
ne
vi = 0 (see the proof of Lemma
3).
We now characterize the conditions under which the regulator prefers high effort to low effort
according to the vertical industry structure. We find from (3) that under vertical separation
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the regulator prefers high effort to low effort if and only if
αEh [W
e
vs] + (1− α)Eh [W
ne
vs ] > αEl [W
e] + (1− α)El [W
ne] ⇐⇒
νhS + (1− νh)S − Eh [t
r
vs (α)] > νlS + (1− νl)S ⇐⇒
Eh [t
r
vs (α)] < ∆ν∆S, (A12)
where Eh [t
r
vs (·)] ≡ ανht
e
vs (see the proof of Lemma 3).
Under vertical integration, the regulator prefers high effort to low effort if and only if
αEh [W
e
vi] + (1− α)Eh [W
ne
vi ] > αEl [W
e] + (1− α)El [W
ne] ⇐⇒
νhS + (1− νh)S − Eh [t
r
vi (α)] > νlS + (1− νl)S ⇐⇒
Eh [t
r
vi (α)] < ∆ν∆S, (A13)
where Eh [t
r
vi (·)] ≡ ανht
e
vi (see the proof of Lemma 3).
It is helpful for the subsequent analysis to derive the following results.
(a) Applying L’Hospital’s rule yields
lim
α→0
Eh [t
r
vs (α)] = lim
α→0
νh
ψ
∆ν
u−1′
(
ψ
α∆ν
)
= +∞,
where the last equality follows from ψ > 0, u−1′ (·) > 0, and u−1′′ (·) > 0. Moreover, we obtain
that
lim
α→0
Eh [t
r
vi (α)] = lim
α→0
νh
ψ −∆ν [u (pi)− u (pi)]
∆ν
u−1′
(
ψ +∆ν [u (pi)− (1− α)u (pi)]
α∆ν
)
= +∞,
where the last equality follows from ψ > ψ0 (by Assumption 1), u
−1′ (·) > 0, and u−1′′ (·) > 0.
(b) Combining the conditions Eh [t
c
vs] < ∆ν∆S and ψ < ψ1 in the proposition with the results
in Lemma 2, we have Eh [t
c
vi] < Eh [t
c
vs] < ∆ν∆S.
Given the results in points (a) and (b), the analysis proceeds through the following three
steps.
(i) It follows from
∂Eh[trvi]
∂α
< 0 (see Lemma 3), limα→0 Eh [t
r
vi (α)] = +∞ (see point (a)) and
Eh [t
c
vi] < ∆ν∆S (see point (b)) that there exists a unique threshold α1 ∈ (0, 1) such that
condition Eh [t
r
vi (α)] < ∆ν∆S in (A13) is satisfied if and only if α > α1. In this case, the
regulator prefers high effort to low effort under vertical integration.
(ii) It follows from ∂Eh[t
r
vs]
∂α
< 0 (see Lemma 3), limα→0 Eh [t
r
vs (α)] = +∞ (see point (a)) and
Eh [t
c
vs] < ∆ν∆S (see point (b)) that there exists a unique threshold α2 ∈ (0, 1) such that
condition Eh [t
r
vs (α)] < ∆ν∆S in (A12) is violated if and only if α ≤ α2. In this case, the
regulator prefers low effort to high effort under vertical separation.
(iii) It follows from
∂Eh[trvi]
∂α
< 0 (see Lemma 3) and Eh [t
c
vi] < Eh [t
c
vs] (see point (b)) that there
exists a unique threshold α3 ∈ (0, 1) such that Eh [t
r
vi (α)] < Eh [t
c
vs] if and only if α > α3.
In this case, the regulator prefers vertical integration with α > α3 to vertical separation with
α = 1.
As long as vertical separation emerges, α = 1 is socially optimal because ∂Eh[t
r
vs]
∂α
< 0.
Moreover, this outcome is always achievable for Eh [t
c
vs] < ∆ν∆S. To see this, recall from
Proposition 1 that, when high effort is incentivized at least under vertical separation, i.e.,
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Eh [t
c
vs] < ∆ν∆S, the firms prefer to remain vertically separated. Given that Eh [t
c
vs] < ∆ν∆S,
the condition Eh [t
r
vi (α)] < Eh [t
c
vs] in step (iii) is more stringent than the condition Eh [t
r
vi (α)] <
∆ν∆S in step (i), which yields α3 > α1. Note from (A5), (A10) and (A11) that vertical
integration is more profitable than vertical separation if and only if high effort is induced under
vertical integration but low effort is induced under vertical separation. Combining the results
in steps (ii) and (iii), we find that, if α3 < α ≤ α2, the firms prefer to vertically integrate
and the regulator provides a lower expected transfer with respect to the best outcome under
vertical separation, i.e., Eh [t
r
vi (α)] < Eh [t
c
vs]. As
∂Eh[trvi]
∂α
< 0, the optimal value for α is
α∗ = α2 ∈ (0, 1), where α
∗ is the unique value for α such that Eh [t
r
vs (α
∗)] = ∆ν∆S. Vertical
integration emerges in equilibrium, and high effort is provided. Expected social welfare is
Eh [W
r
vi (α
∗)] = νhS + (1− νh)S − Eh [t
r
vi (α
∗)].
We now show that there exists a threshold ψ∗ for the cost of effort ψ, with ψ0 < ψ
∗ < ψ1,
such that Eh [t
r
vi (α
∗)] < Eh [t
c
vs] if and only if ψ < ψ
∗, and therefore the interval α3 < α ≤
α2 = α
∗ is nonempty. Recalling from the proofs of Lemmas 2 and 3 that Eh [t
c
vs] ≡ νht
c
vs and
Eh [t
r
vi (α)] ≡ ανht
e
vi, we find that Eh [t
r
vi (α
∗)]|ψ=ψ0 = 0 < Eh [t
c
vs]|ψ=ψ0 = νhu
−1 (u (pi)− u (pi)),
where ψ0 is defined in Lemma 1. Therefore, there exists a range for ψ such that for ψ > ψ0 it
holds Eh [t
r
vi (α
∗)] < Eh [t
c
vs]. Moreover, taking the derivative of Eh [t
c
vs] with respect to ψ and
evaluating it at ψ = ψ0 yields
∂Eh [t
c
vs]
∂ψ
∣∣∣∣
ψ=ψ0
=
νh
∆ν
u−1′ (u (pi)− u (pi)) . (A14)
Taking the derivative of Eh [t
r
vi (α
∗)] with respect to ψ yields after some manipulation
∂Eh [t
r
vi (α
∗)]
∂ψ
= νh
{
∂α∗
∂ψ
[
u−1
(
ψ
α∗∆ν
+
u (pi)− (1− α∗)u (pi)
α∗
)
− pi
]
+
α∗ − ∂α
∗
∂ψ
{ψ −∆ν [u (pi)− u (pi)]}
α∗∆ν
u−1′
(
ψ
α∗∆ν
+
u (pi)− (1− α∗)u (pi)
α∗
)}
.
Evaluating this expression at ψ = ψ0, we obtain that
∂Eh [t
r
vi (α
∗)]
∂ψ
∣∣∣∣
ψ=ψ0
=
νh
∆ν
u−1′ (u (pi)) . (A15)
Recalling Eh [t
c
vs]|ψ=ψ0 = νhu
−1 (u (pi)− u (pi)) and Eh [t
r
vi (α
∗)]|ψ=ψ0 = 0 and using (A14) and
(A15), a first-order Taylor approximation yields
Eh [t
c
vs] ≈ Eh [t
c
vs]|ψ=ψ0 + (ψ − ψ0)
∂Eh [t
c
vs]
∂ψ
∣∣∣∣
ψ=ψ0
= νhu
−1 (u (pi)− u (pi)) +
νh
∆ν
(ψ − ψ0)u
−1′ (u (pi)− u (pi))
and
Eh [t
r
vi (α
∗)] ≈ Eh [t
r
vi (α
∗)]|ψ=ψ0 +(ψ − ψ0)
∂Eh [t
r
vi (α
∗)]
∂ψ
∣∣∣∣
ψ=ψ0
=
νh
∆ν
(ψ − ψ0)u
−1′ (u (pi)) .
It holds Eh [t
r
vi (α
∗)] < Eh [t
c
vs] if and only if
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ψ < ψ∗ ≡ ψ0 +∆ν
u−1 (u (pi)− u (pi))
u−1′ (u (pi))− u−1′ (u (pi)− u (pi))
, (A16)
where ψ∗ > ψ0 follows from pi > pi ≥ 0, u
−1′ (·) > 0, and u−1′′ (·) > 0. Note from Lemma 2 that
Eh [t
c
vi] < Eh [t
r
vi (α
∗)] < Eh [t
c
vs] implies ψ
∗ < ψ1.
Proof of Proposition 3. Suppose first that Eh [t
c
vi] ≤ Eh [t
c
vs]. The following three cases
emerge.
(I) Eh [t
c
vi] ≤ Eh [t
c
vs] < ∆ν∆S and ψ > ψ
∗. It follows from the proof of Proposition 2 that
α∗ = 1. Vertical separation emerges in equilibrium, and high effort is provided. Expected social
welfare is Eh [W
c
vs] = νhS + (1− νh)S − Eh [t
c
vs].
(II) Eh [t
c
vi] < ∆ν∆S ≤ Eh [t
c
vs]. Since condition (A12) is violated, the regulator prefers low
effort under vertical separation. However, we know from condition (A13) that the regulator
prefers high effort under vertical integration (and therefore it prefers vertical integration to
vertical separation) for α high enough. As
∂Eh[trvi]
∂α
< 0 (see Lemma 3), we obtain α∗ = 1. It
follows from (A5) and (A11) that vertical integration emerges in equilibrium, and high effort is
provided. Expected social welfare is Eh [W
c
vi] = νhS + (1− νh)S − Eh [t
c
vi].
(III) Eh [t
c
vi] ≥ ∆ν∆S. Since conditions (A12) and (A13) are violated, the regulator prefers
low effort irrespective of the vertical industry structure. This implies that any probability
α∗ ∈ [0, 1] of regulatory enforcement can be sustained in equilibrium. It follows from (A5)
that the firms are indifferent about the vertical industry structure. Expected social welfare is
El [W ] = νlS + (1− νl)S.
Now, suppose that Eh [t
c
vi] > Eh [t
c
vs]. The following two cases emerge.
(IV) Eh [t
c
vs] < ∆ν∆S. It follows from condition (A12) that the regulator prefers high effort
under vertical separation for α high enough. Moreover, under full commitment the regulator
prefers vertical separation to vertical integration irrespective of the effort exerted under vertical
integration (Eh [t
c
vi] > Eh [t
c
vs] and Eh [t
c
vs] < ∆ν∆S). As
∂Eh[t
r
vs]
∂α
< 0 and
∂Eh[trvi]
∂α
< 0 (see
Lemma 3), we find that α∗ = 1. It follows from (A5) and (A10) that vertical separation
emerges in equilibrium, and high effort is provided. Expected social welfare is Eh [W
c
vs] =
νhS + (1− νh)S − Eh [t
c
vs].
(V) Eh [t
c
vs] ≥ ∆ν∆S. Then, the outcome in case (III) applies.
Point (i) of the proposition follows from cases (I) and (IV). Point (ii) of the proposition
follows from case (II). Point (iii) of the proposition follows from cases (III) and (V).
Proof of Remark 1. In the Cournot equilibrium, the payoff of downstream firm j ∈ {1, ..., N}
is pi = (1−c)
2
(1+N)2
, where c ∈ {c, c} is such that 0 ≤ c < c < 1 and ∆c ≡ c − c > 0. Assuming
that S in (3) represents consumer surplus, we have S = (1−c)
2N2
2(1+N)2
, where S ∈
{
S, S
}
and
∆S ≡ S − S = (2−c−c)N
2∆c
2(1+N)2
> 0. Using the utility function in (6), the results in the remark
directly follow from Proposition 2.
We now characterize the nonempty interval for the cost of high effort ψ where regulatory
risk is optimal. For ρ > 0, Assumption 1 becomes the following.
Assumption 1′ ψ > ψ0 ≡
∆ν
ρ
[
e
−ρ
(1−c)2
(1+N)2 − e
−ρ
(1−c)2
(1+N)2
]
.
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Recalling ∆S ≡ S − S = (2−c−c)N
2∆c
2(1+N)2
and ∂Eh[t
c
vs]
∂ψ
> 0 (see Lemma 2) and using (6), we find
that Eh [t
c
vs] < ∆ν∆S if and only if ψ < ψ
c
vs, where ψ
c
vs satisfies
νh ln
(
1−
ρψcvs
∆ν
)
+ ρ∆ν
(2− c− c)N2∆c
2 (1 +N)2
= 0.
This yields after some manipulation
ψcvs ≡
∆ν
ρ
[
1− e
−ρ∆ν
(2−c−c)N2∆c
2νh(1+N)
2
]
. (A17)
The conditions ψ > ψ0 (by Assumption 1
′) and Eh [t
c
vs] < ∆ν∆S (by supposition in the remark)
must be simultaneously satisfied. As Eh [t
c
vs] < ∆ν∆S if and only if ψ < ψ
c
vs (where ψ
c
vs is
defined by (A17)), this corresponds to ψcvs > ψ0. For the sake of convenience, we consider
a sufficiently small degree of risk aversion ρ. We find that limρ→0 ψ
c
vs =
(2−c−c)N2∆c∆ν2
2νh(1+N)
2 >
limρ→0 ψ0 =
(2−c−c)∆c∆ν
(1+N)2
if and only if
(2−c−c)(N2∆ν−2νh)∆c∆ν
2νh(1+N)
2 > 0. For N = 2, this reduces
to νh > 2νl, given the assumptions on the parameters of the model. For N > 2, the condition
νh > 2νl is sufficient but no longer necessary.
Proof of Remark 2. Applying the implicit function theorem to (7) yields after some manip-
ulation
∂α∗
∂N
=
(2− c− c)N∆c∆ν
∂Eh[tcvs]
∂α
(1 +N)3
< 0,
where the inequality follows from ∂Eh[t
c
vs]
∂α
< 0 (see Lemma 3) and the assumptions on the
parameters of the model. Moreover, we obtain that
∂α∗
∂ρ
= −
[
ρψ
α∗∆ν − ρψ
+ ln
(
1−
ρψ
α∗∆ν
)]
α∗νh
∂Eh[trvs]
∂α
ρ2
> 0,
where the inequality follows from ∂Eh[t
r
vs]
∂α
< 0 and the positive sign of the expression in square
brackets due to the assumptions on the parameters of the model.
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Regulatory risk, vertical integration, and upstream investment
Supplementary Appendix
Raffaele Fiocco∗ Dongyu Guo†
In this Supplementary Appendix we show that our results carry over to non-additively
separable preferences. In the spirit of Grossman and Hart (1983), we consider a utility function
of the form
U (x, e) = γeu (x)− ψe, (S1)
where γe is a function of effort e, u (·) is an increasing and (weakly) concave function of the payoff
x ≥ 0 (with u (0) = 0), and ψe denotes the cost of effort, which is zero for low effort and ψ > 0
for high effort. Let γe = γh with high effort and γe = γl with low effort. The probabilities of
investment success associated with high and low effort are respectively νh ∈ (0, 1) and νl ∈ (0, 1),
with ∆ν ≡ νh − νl > 0. To ensure interior solutions, we assume that
νl
νh
< γh
γl
< 1−νl1−νh
.1
Using (S1), the upstream firm’s utility is
Πu = γeu (t)− ψe, (S2)
where the upstream transfer t is such that t ≥ 0 by limited liability. This transfer is determined
by the regulator according to the investment outcome, i.e., t ∈
{
t, t
}
, where t identifies the
transfer in case of success and t the transfer in case of failure.
The vertically integrated firm’s utility is
Πvi = γeu (t+ pi)− ψe, (S3)
where pi ≥ 0 is the downstream payoff, which is higher in case of investment success than in
case of failure, i.e., pi ∈ {pi, pi} and pi > pi.
The regulator’s social welfare function is
W = S − t, (S4)
where S > 0 represents the gross surplus from investment, which is higher in case of investment
success than in case of failure, i.e., S ∈
{
S, S
}
and ∆S ≡ S − S > 0.
In the following remark, we summarize what happens when the cost of high investment
effort is relatively small. The results reflect those of Lemma 1 in the paper.
∗University of Bergamo, Department of Management, Economics and Quantitative Methods, Via dei Caniana
2, 24127 Bergamo, Italy. Email address: raffaele.fiocco@unibg.it
†University of Duisburg-Essen, Mercator School of Management, Lotharstraße 65, 47057 Duisburg, Germany.
Email address: dongyu.guo@uni-due.de
1As νh−νl > 0, this condition is always satisfied for γh = γl, namely, when U (·) in (S1) is additively separable
in money and effort. By continuity, this holds for γh 6= γl.
1
Remark 3 Suppose ψ ≤ ψ0 ≡ u (pi) (νhγh − νlγl) − u (pi) [(1− νl) γl − (1− νh) γh]. Then, the
equilibrium probability of regulatory enforcement is α∗ = 0. Vertical integration emerges, and
high investment effort is provided at no social cost.
Proof of Remark 3. We derive the threshold ψ0. Using (S3), the moral hazard incentive
constraint Eh [Πvi] ≥ El [Πvi] under vertical integration for α = 0 (which implies t = t = 0) is
given by
νhγhu (pi) + (1− νh) γhu (pi)− ψ ≥ νlγlu (pi) + (1− νl) γlu (pi) ,
which is satisfied if and only if ψ ≤ ψ0, where ψ0 is defined in the remark. The rest of the proof
directly follows from the proof of Lemma 1 in the paper.
For the sake of simplicity, we focus on the case where ψ0 > 0. Throughout the analysis, we
impose the following assumption.
Assumption 1′′ ψ > ψ0 ≡ u (pi) (νhγh − νlγl)− u (pi) [(1− νl) γl − (1− νh) γh].
In the following remark, we compare the full commitment expected transfers in the two
vertical industry structures. The results correspond to those of Lemma 2 in the paper.
Remark 4 Under firm risk neutrality (u′′ (·) = 0), it holds Eh [t
c
vi] < Eh [t
c
vs]. Under firm risk
aversion (u′′ (·) < 0), there exists a threshold ψ1, with ψ1 > ψ0, such that Eh [t
c
vi] < Eh [t
c
vs] if
and only if ψ < ψ1.
Proof of Remark 4. Using (S2), the moral hazard incentive constraint Eh [Πu] ≥ El [Πu]
under vertical separation is given by
νhγhu
(
t
)
+ (1− νh) γhu (t)− ψ ≥ νlγlu
(
t
)
+ (1− νl) γlu (t) . (S5)
Since upstream transfers reduce social welfare in (S4), the limited liability constraint t ≥ 0 in
case of investment failure and the moral hazard incentive constraint (S5) are binding in equilib-
rium. Hence, under vertical separation, when high effort is incentivized, the full commitment
transfers are tcvs = 0 in case of investment failure and
t
c
vs = u
−1
(
ψ
νhγh − νlγl
)
(S6)
in case of investment success.
Using (S3), the moral hazard incentive constraint Eh [Πvi] ≥ El [Πvi] under vertical integra-
tion is given by
νhγhu
(
t+ pi
)
+ (1− νh) γhu (t+ pi)− ψ ≥ νlγlu
(
t+ pi
)
+ (1− νl) γlu (t+ pi) . (S7)
As under vertical separation, since upstream transfers reduce social welfare in (S4), the limited
liability constraint t ≥ 0 and the moral hazard incentive constraint (S7) are binding in equilib-
rium. Hence, under vertical integration, when high effort is incentivized, the full commitment
transfers are tcvi = 0 in case of investment failure and
t
c
vi = u
−1
(
ψ
νhγh − νlγl
+
(1− νl) γl − (1− νh) γh
νhγh − νlγl
u (pi)
)
− pi (S8)
2
in case of investment success.
Defining Eh [t
c
vs] ≡ νht
c
vs and Eh [t
c
vi] ≡ νht
c
vi, where t
c
vs and t
c
vi are given by (S6) and (S8)
respectively, we find that Eh [t
c
vi] < Eh [t
c
vs] under risk neutrality (u
′′ (·) = 0). Now, we turn to
the case of risk aversion (u′′ (·) < 0). Differentiating Eh [t
c
vs] and Eh [t
c
vi] with respect to ψ yields
∂Eh [t
c
vs]
∂ψ
=
νh
νhγh − νlγl
u−1′
(
ψ
νhγh − νlγl
)
and
∂Eh [t
c
vi]
∂ψ
=
νh
νhγh − νlγl
u−1′
(
ψ
νhγh − νlγl
+
(1− νl) γl − (1− νh) γh
νhγh − νlγl
u (pi)
)
.
It follows from
∂Eh[tcvi]
∂ψ
>
∂Eh[t
c
vs]
∂ψ
> 0 (as u−1′ (·) > 0 and u−1′′ (·) > 0) and Eh [t
c
vs]|ψ=ψ0 >
Eh [t
c
vi]|ψ=ψ0 = 0 (where ψ0 is defined in Remark 3) that there exists a unique (possibly large)
threshold ψ1, with ψ1 > ψ0, such that Eh [t
c
vi] < Eh [t
c
vs] if and only if ψ < ψ1.
In the following remark, we formalize the results under full commitment, where the reg-
ulatory policy is enforced with certainty. The results reflects those of Proposition 1 in the
paper.
Remark 5 Suppose that the probability of regulatory enforcement is α = 1.
(i) If Eh [t
c
vs] < ∆ν∆S, vertical separation emerges, and high investment effort is provided.
(ii) If Eh [t
c
vi] < ∆ν∆S ≤ Eh [t
c
vs], vertical integration emerges, and high investment effort
is provided.
(iii) Otherwise, i.e., if min {Eh [t
c
vi] ,Eh [t
c
vs]} ≥ ∆ν∆S, the vertical industry structure is
inconsequential, and low investment effort is provided.
Proof of Remark 5. Using (S2), the vertically separated firms’ (expected) aggregate utility
Eh [Π
c
vs] from high effort is given by
Eh [Π
c
vs] = νh
[
γhu
(
t
c
vs
)
+ γhu (pi)
]
+ (1− νh) [γhu (t
c
vs) + γhu (pi)]− ψ
=
νlγl
νhγh − νlγl
ψ + νhγhu (pi) + (1− νh) γhu (pi) , (S9)
where t
c
vs is given by (S6) and t
c
vs = 0 (see the proof of Remark 4).
Using (S3), the vertically integrated firm’s (expected) utility Eh [Π
c
vi] from high effort is
given by
Eh [Π
c
vi] = νhγhu
(
t
c
vi + pi
)
+ (1− νh) γhu (t
c
vi + pi)− ψ
=
νlγl
νhγh − νlγl
ψ +
∆νγhγl
νhγh − νlγl
u (pi) , (S10)
where t
c
vi is given by (S8) and t
c
vi = 0 (see the proof of Remark 4).
Now, suppose that the regulator demands low effort. In this case, it suffices to set the
transfer at the lowest level compatible with the regulated firm’s limited liability irrespective of
the investment outcome, i.e., t = t = 0. It follows from Remark 3 and Assumption 1′′ that low
effort is provided in the two vertical industry structures. This yields
El [Π
c
vs] = El [Π
c
vi] = νlγlu (pi) + (1− νl) γlu (pi) . (S11)
3
Using (S9) and (S10), we find that
Eh [Π
c
vs] > Eh [Π
c
vi] ⇐⇒ (νhγh − νlγl)u (pi)− [(1− νl) γl − (1− νh) γh]u (pi) > 0,
where the inequality follows from the assumptions on the parameters of the model. Moreover,
using (S10) and (S11) yields
Eh [Π
c
vi] > El [Π
c
vs] ⇐⇒ ψ + [(1− νl) γl − (1− νh) γh]u (pi)− (νhγh − νlγl)u (pi) > 0,
where the inequality follows from ψ > ψ0 (by Assumption 1
′′). The rest of the proof directly
follows from the proof of Proposition 1 in the paper.
In the following remark, we investigate the impact of the probability α of regulatory enforce-
ment upon the expected transfers in the two vertical industry structures. The results correspond
to those of Lemma 3 in the paper.
Remark 6 It holds ∂Eh[t
r
vs]
∂α
≤ 0 and
∂Eh[trvi]
∂α
≤ 0, where the strict inequalities follow under firm
risk aversion (u′′ (·) < 0).
Proof of Remark 6. The moral hazard incentive constraint under vertical separation is
αEh [Π
e
u] + (1− α)Eh [Π
ne
u ] ≥ αEl [Π
e
u] + (1− α)El [Π
ne
u ] .
With probability α, the regulatory policy is enforced and the upstream firm receives expected
utility Eh [Π
e
u] from high effort and El [Π
e
u] from low effort. With complementary probability
1 − α, the regulatory policy is not enforced and a new, sequentially optimal policy is offered
by the regulator. This gives the upstream firm expected utility Eh [Π
ne
u ] from high effort and
El [Π
ne
u ] from low effort. Using (S2), we have
α
[
νhγhu
(
t
e)
+ (1− νh) γhu (t
e)
]
+ (1− α)
[
νhγhu
(
t
ne)
+ (1− νh) γhu (t
ne)
]
− ψ ≥
α
[
νlγlu
(
t
e)
+ (1− νl) γlu (t
e)
]
+ (1− α)
[
νlγlu
(
t
ne)
+ (1− νl) γlu (t
ne)
]
. (S12)
Since upstream transfers reduce social welfare in (S4), the limited liability constraints te ≥ 0 and
tne ≥ 0 in case of investment failure as well as the moral hazard incentive constraint (S12) are
binding in equilibrium. With probability α, the regulatory policy is enforced, and the vertically
separated upstream firm obtains tevs = 0 in case of investment failure and
t
e
vs = u
−1
(
ψ
α (νhγh − νlγl)
)
(S13)
in case of investment success. With probability 1−α, the regulatory policy is not enforced, and
the new, sequentially optimal policy yields tnevs = t
ne
vs = 0.
The moral hazard incentive constraint under vertical integration is
αEh [Π
e
vi] + (1− α)Eh [Π
ne
vi ] ≥ αEl [Π
e
vi] + (1− α)El [Π
ne
vi ] .
With probability α, the regulatory policy is enforced and the upstream firm receives expected
utility Eh [Π
e
vi] from high effort and El [Π
e
vi] from low effort. With complementary probability
1 − α, the regulatory policy is not enforced and a new, sequentially optimal policy is offered
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by the regulator. This gives the vertically integrated firm expected utility Eh [Π
ne
vi ] from high
effort and El [Π
ne
vi ] from low effort. Using (S3), we have
α
[
νhγhu
(
t
e
+ pi
)
+ (1− νh) γhu (t
e + pi)
]
+(1− α)
[
νhγhu
(
t
ne
+ pi
)
+ (1− νh) γhu (t
ne + pi)
]
− ψ ≥
α
[
νlγlu
(
t
e
+ pi
)
+ (1− νl) γlu (t
e + pi)
]
+(1− α)
[
νlγlu
(
t
ne
+ pi
)
+ (1− νl) γlu (t
ne + pi)
]
. (S14)
As under vertical separation, since upstream transfers reduce social welfare in (S4), the limited
liability constraints te ≥ 0 and tne ≥ 0 as well as the moral hazard incentive constraint (S14) are
binding in equilibrium. With probability α, the regulatory policy is enforced, and the vertically
integrated firm obtains tevi = 0 in case of investment failure and
t
e
vi = u
−1
(
ψ
α (νhγh − νlγl)
+
(1− νl) γl − (1− νh) γh
α (νhγh − νlγl)
u (pi)−
1− α
α
u (pi)
)
− pi (S15)
in case of investment success. With probability 1−α, the regulatory policy is not enforced, and
the new, sequentially optimal policy yields tnevi = t
ne
vi = 0.
Taking the derivative of Eh [t
r
vs] ≡ ανht
e
vs, where t
e
vs is given by (S13), with respect to α
yields
∂Eh [t
r
vs]
∂α
= νh
[
u−1
(
ψ
α (νhγh − νlγl)
)
−
ψ
α (νhγh − νlγl)
u−1′
(
ψ
α (νhγh − νlγl)
)]
.
It holds ∂Eh[t
r
vs]
∂α
= 0 under risk neutrality (u′′ (·) = 0). To establish the sign of ∂Eh[t
r
vs]
∂α
under risk
aversion (u′′ (·) < 0), we investigate how ∂Eh[t
r
vs]
∂α
varies with ψ. We find that ∂Eh[t
r
vs]
∂α
∣∣∣
ψ=0
= 0
and
∂2Eh [t
r
vs]
∂α∂ψ
= −
νhψ
α2 (νhγh − νlγl)
2u
−1′′
(
ψ
α (νhγh − νlγl)
)
< 0,
where the inequality follows from ψ > 0 and u−1′′ (·) > 0. This implies that ∂Eh[t
r
vs]
∂α
< 0.
Taking the derivative of Eh [t
r
vi] ≡ ανht
e
vi, where t
e
vi is given by (S15), with respect to α
yields
∂Eh [t
r
vi]
∂α
= νh
{
u−1
(
ψ
α (νhγh − νlγl)
+
(1− νl) γl − (1− νh) γh
α (νhγh − νlγl)
u (pi)−
1− α
α
u (pi)
)
− pi −
[
ψ
α (νhγh − νlγl)
+
(1− νl) γl − (1− νh) γh
α (νhγh − νlγl)
u (pi)−
u (pi)
α
]
×u−1′
(
ψ
α (νhγh − νlγl)
+
(1− νl) γl − (1− νh) γh
α (νhγh − νlγl)
u (pi)−
1− α
α
u (pi)
)}
.
It holds
∂Eh[trvi]
∂α
= 0 under risk neutrality (u′′ (·) = 0). To establish the sign of
∂Eh[trvi]
∂α
under risk
aversion (u′′ (·) < 0), we investigate how
∂Eh[trvi]
∂α
varies with ψ. We find that
∂Eh[trvi]
∂α
∣∣∣∣
ψ=ψ0
= 0
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and
∂2Eh [t
r
vi]
∂α∂ψ
= −νh
ψ + [(1− νl) γl − (1− νh) γh]u (pi)− (νhγh − νlγl)u (pi)
α2 (νhγh − νlγl)
2
× u−1′′
(
ψ
α (νhγh − νlγl)
+
(1− νl) γl − (1− νh) γh
α (νhγh − νlγl)
u (pi)−
1− α
α
u (pi)
)
< 0,
where the inequality follows from ψ > ψ0 (by Assumption 1
′′) and u−1′′ (·) > 0. This implies
that
∂Eh[trvi]
∂α
< 0.
In the following remark, we show that, when the vertical industry structure is endogenized,
some degree of regulatory risk can be socially beneficial. This corroborates the main results of
the paper collected in Proposition 2. Note that Proposition 3 in the paper and the associated
proof remain unaltered.
Remark 7 Suppose Eh [t
c
vs] < ∆ν∆S and firm risk aversion (u
′′ (·) < 0). Then, there exists a
threshold ψ∗, with ψ0 < ψ
∗ < ψ1, such that for ψ < ψ
∗ some degree of regulatory risk is optimal.
The equilibrium probability of regulatory enforcement is α∗ ∈ (0, 1), where α∗ is the unique value
for α such that Eh [t
r
vs (α
∗)] = ∆ν∆S. Vertical integration emerges, and high investment effort
is provided.
Proof of Remark 7. Using (S2), the vertically separated firms’ (expected) aggregate utility
Eh [Π
r
vs] ≡ αEh [Π
e
vs] + (1− α)Eh [Π
ne
vs ] from high effort is given by
Eh [Π
r
vs] = α
{
νh
[
γhu
(
t
e
vs
)
+ γhu (pi)
]
+ (1− νh) [γhu (t
e
vs) + γhu (pi)]
}
+ (1− α)
{
νh
[
γhu
(
t
ne
vs
)
+ γhu (pi)
]
+ (1− νh) [γhu (t
ne
vs) + γhu (pi)]
}
− ψ
=
νlγl
νhγh − νlγl
ψ + νhγhu (pi) + (1− νh) γhu (pi) ,
where t
e
vs is given by (S13) and t
e
vs = t
ne
vs = t
ne
vs = 0 (see the proof of Remark 6).
The vertically integrated firm’s (expected) utility Eh [Π
r
vi] ≡ αEh [Π
e
vi] + (1− α)Eh [Π
ne
vi ]
from high effort is given by
Eh [Π
r
vi] = α
[
νhγhu
(
t
e
vi + pi
)
+ (1− νh) γhu (t
e
vi + pi)
]
+ (1− α)
[
νhγhu
(
t
ne
vi + pi
)
+ (1− νh) γhu (t
ne
vi + pi)
]
− ψ
=
νlγl
νhγh − νlγl
ψ +
∆νγhγl
νhγh − νlγl
u (pi) ,
where t
e
vi is given by (S15) and t
e
vi = t
ne
vi = t
ne
vi = 0 (see the proof of Remark 6).
Using Eh [t
r
vs (α)] ≡ ανht
e
vs, where t
e
vs is given by (S13), and applying L’Hospital’s rule yields
lim
α→0
Eh [t
r
vs (α)] = lim
α→0
νhψ
νhγh − νlγl
u−1′
(
ψ
α (νhγh − νlγl)
)
= +∞,
where the inequality follows from ψ > 0, u−1′ (·) > 0, and u−1′′ (·) > 0.
Using Eh [t
r
vi (α)] ≡ ανht
e
vi, where t
e
vi is given by (S15), and applying L’Hospital’s rule yields
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after some manipulation
lim
α→0
Eh [t
r
vi (α)] = lim
α→0
νh
[
ψ
νhγh − νlγl
+
(1− νl) γl − (1− νh) γh
νhγh − νlγl
u (pi)− u (pi)
]
× u−1′
(
ψ
α (νhγh − νlγl)
+
(1− νl) γl − (1− νh) γh
α (νhγh − νlγl)
u (pi)−
1− α
α
u (pi)
)
= +∞,
where the inequality follows from ψ > ψ0 (by Assumption 1
′′), u−1′ (·) > 0, and u−1′′ (·) > 0.
The rest of the proof goes along the same lines as the proof of Proposition 2 in the paper.
Finally, we show that there exists a threshold ψ∗ for the cost of effort ψ, with ψ0 < ψ
∗ < ψ1,
such Eh [t
r
vi (α
∗)] < Eh [t
c
vs] if and only if ψ < ψ
∗. As Eh [t
r
vi (α)] ≡ ανht
e
vi and Eh [t
c
vs] ≡ νht
c
vs
(see the proofs of Remarks 4 and 6), we find that Eh [t
r
vi (α
∗)]|ψ=ψ0 = 0 < Eh [t
c
vs]|ψ=ψ0 =
νhu
−1
(
u (pi)− (1−νl)γl−(1−νh)γh
νhγh−νlγl
u (pi)
)
, where ψ0 is defined in Remark 3. Moreover, taking the
derivative of Eh [t
c
vs] with respect to ψ and evaluating it at ψ = ψ0 yields
∂Eh [t
c
vs]
∂ψ
∣∣∣∣
ψ=ψ0
=
νh
νhγh − νlγl
u−1′
(
u (pi)−
(1− νl) γl − (1− νh) γh
νhγh − νlγl
u (pi)
)
. (S16)
Taking the derivative of Eh [t
r
vi (α
∗)] with respect to ψ yields after some manipulation
∂Eh [t
r
vi (α
∗)]
∂ψ
=
[
u−1
(
ψ
α∗ (νhγh − νlγl)
+
(1− νl) γl − (1− νh) γh
α∗ (νhγh − νlγl)
u (pi)−
1− α∗
α∗
u (pi)
)
− pi
]
× νh
∂α∗
∂ψ
+
α∗ − ∂α
∗
∂ψ
{ψ + [(1− νl) γl − (1− νh) γh]u (pi)− (νhγh − νlγl)u (pi)}
α∗ (νhγh − νlγl)
× νhu
−1′
(
ψ
α∗ (νhγh − νlγl)
+
(1− νl) γl − (1− νh) γh
α∗ (νhγh − νlγl)
u (pi)−
1− α∗
α∗
u (pi)
)
.
Evaluating this expression at ψ = ψ0, we obtain
∂Eh [t
r
vi (α
∗)]
∂ψ
∣∣∣∣
ψ=ψ0
=
νh
νhγh − νlγl
u−1′ (u (pi)) . (S17)
Recalling Eh [t
c
vs]|ψ=ψ0 = νhu
−1
(
u (pi)− (1−νl)γl−(1−νh)γh
νhγh−νlγl
u (pi)
)
and Eh [t
r
vi (α
∗)]|ψ=ψ0 = 0 and
using (S16) and (S17), a first-order Taylor approximation yields
Eh [t
c
vs] ≈ Eh [t
c
vs]|ψ=ψ0 + (ψ − ψ0)
∂Eh [t
c
vs]
∂ψ
∣∣∣∣
ψ=ψ0
= νhu
−1
(
u (pi)−
(1− νl) γl − (1− νh) γh
νhγh − νlγl
u (pi)
)
+
νh
νhγh − νlγl
(ψ − ψ0)u
−1′
(
u (pi)−
(1− νl) γl − (1− νh) γh
νhγh − νlγl
u (pi)
)
and
Eh [t
r
vi (α
∗)] ≈ Eh [t
r
vi (α
∗)]|ψ=ψ0 + (ψ − ψ0)
∂Eh [t
r
vi (α
∗)]
∂ψ
∣∣∣∣
ψ=ψ0
=
νh
νhγh − νlγl
(ψ − ψ0)u
−1′ (u (pi)) .
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It holds Eh [t
r
vi (α
∗)] < Eh [t
c
vs] if and only if
ψ < ψ∗ ≡ ψ0 + (νhγh − νlγl)
u−1
(
u (pi)− (1−νl)γl−(1−νh)γh
νhγh−νlγl
u (pi)
)
u−1′ (u (pi))− u−1′
(
u (pi)− (1−νl)γl−(1−νh)γh
νhγh−νlγl
u (pi)
) ,
where ψ∗ > ψ0 follows from the assumptions on the parameters of the model. We find from
Remark 4 that Eh [t
c
vi] < Eh [t
r
vi (α
∗)] < Eh [t
c
vs] implies ψ
∗ < ψ1.
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